Sultan Yousef Al Hosani
201813295
1
The decision by Russia to encroach on and annex Crimea in 2014 was fueled by the slippery relationship between Ukraine and Russia. Different political commentators and scholars have identified possible reasons for Russia’s involvement in the separation of the Peninsula of Crimea from the Ukraine territory. Due to the heightened tensions between the neighboring countries, Russia made a prompt and risky political move to take a pinch of the Ukrainian territory. According to Grant (2015), the estimated cost of Crimean annexation is roughly $82 million. However, against this huge budget, Russia reaped more benefits politically, geographically, and economically after the annexation. Through the annexation, Ukraine was the most affected, particularly when the move by Russia undermined its sovereignty. At the behest of all the political and military turmoil, Ukraine and the international community have continued to lay claim that Crimea is predominantly under the territory of Ukraine. This article assesses the tenets of realism theory, such as national interests, the balance of power, and anarchy in the interference of Russia in Ukrainian affairs. The elements include the reasons which prompted Russia to annex Crimea, the benefits Russia reaped from the annexation, and the effects of annexation in Ukraine regarding how Ukraine responded to the crisis.
Literature Review
Mearsheimer (2014) discusses the real cause of the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. According to the article, Europe and the West are solely to blame for the sore relationship between the neighboring countries, Russia and Ukraine. According to the article by Mearsheimer (2014), the involvement of the West in Russia-Ukrainian affairs was a threat to the balance of power in the Eastern European region. Ukraine’s desire to join NATO and lean towards Europe and the US aggravated the crisis, as Russia felt threatened by NATO members giving overwhelming support to Ukraine. According to Russia, this was an attack on Russia’s territorial integrity, which resulted in Russia’s decision to influence the Crimean annexation. With Crimea an independent state, Russia would automatically access the Mediterranean Sea. Forsberg & Pursiainen (2017) assesses the influence of Russia’s foreign policy and its contribution to the annexation of Crimea. Russia has a self-sufficiency and independence approach toward diplomacy, which necessitates it to enforce its territorial integrity. Kremlin has therefore remained vigilant against any country interfering with any of the areas under its influence.
Schatz & Koval (2019) investigate the geographical importance of Crimea to Russia’s territory. The article explores the significance of ocean development in Russia’s interest in Crimea. Indeed, installing a friendly government in Crimea would allow the free passage of Russian ships through Ketch Strait into Sevastopol. Therefore, even if the other European countries locked Russia from international trade, Russia would still have access to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea. However, Teper (2016) thinks that Russia has an identity of imposing imperialistic rule over its interest territories or elsewhere. Therefore, with the strategic location of Crimea, Russia was bound to exert its influence over the peninsula to secure its military interests.
Background
In 1954, the Crimean Oblast was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR by the then-leader of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, as an administrative action. In 2014, Russia sent masked troops to the capital of Crimea and forced the retraction of Ukrainian forces. Russia declared its interest in Crimean affairs, and Putin claimed that the people of Crimea were originally Russians and would forever be so. The Russian invasion of the Crimean Peninsula began with capturing strategic sites in Crimea, such as military bases, airports, and parliamentary buildings. Moscow then installed a pro-Russia Sergey Valeryevich Aksyonov leader to govern Crimea, followed by a controversial referendum allowing Crimeans to choose whether they wanted to be part of the Russian territory or not. The first step in establishing a Crimean government that would be favorable to Russia was to create a state of anarchy in the Crimean region. In the referendum, there was an 86% voter turnout and an overwhelming vote to annex Crimea from Ukraine.
How Russia Benefited from the Annexation
Being the initiator of the Crimean annexation, Russia benefitted the most from the Crimean annexation. Crimea’s position provided economic, strategic, and political advantages to Russia. Despite Russia spending about $82 billion to annex and enable the establishment of a sovereign government fully, Russia would benefit immensely from the favorable administration that was put in place by Moscow. The advantages that Russia enjoyed included:
First, Crimea was strategically positioned in the eastern region as the peninsula bordered all the large water bodies. The peninsula provided deep harbors that provided immense economic advantages to Ukraine. In essence, Crimea opened up the economy of Ukraine tremendously due to high dependency on all the major ports in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean (Olekseyuk & Schürenberg‐Frosch, 2019). Therefore, after the annexation of Ukraine, Russia had ready access to the harbors initially controlled by Ukraine. Thence, Russia benefitted by suffocating Ukraine and minimized the economic options available to Ukraine. Ukraine, therefore, lost a key region that drove its economy. With all of these economic advantages falling into the hands of Russia, Russia was presented with more alternatives to its already thriving economy. Moreover, the peninsula’s terrain gives a military advantage because of the hills and valleys, naturally making it easy to spot enemies from a distance. To really take control of the Eastern block provided that the region of Crimea had to be under a government favorable to Moscow as opposed to the cruel Ukrainian government.
Secondly, Russia’s successful annexation of Crimea was a massive loss to Ukraine since it lost part of its territory. Russia’s initial approach to the annexation was carried out through its proxies to give it the image of a state which respected the sovereignty over other states. When its troops pushed the Ukrainian military out of the peninsula, the annexation was already a success, and Russia claimed responsibility, citing the liberation of the Crimean people from Ukrainian rule. Russia was careful not to take part in the full annexation process actively. However, it preferred to allow Crimea to decide whether to detach from Ukraine or not, and Crimea chose to separate from Crimea. This unanimous decision made through a referendum reaffirmed Russia’s assessment of Ukraine as a weak rule which could not adequately represent the interests of the West, at least not under the watch of Putin. Therefore, the annexation was a victory for Russia over Ukraine and the larger international community sympathetic to the West. This victory reaffirmed Russia’s position in the region and tended to remind its neighbors who had thought of joining NATO that NATO would not be present when tragedy stroked.
Comparison
The annexation of Crimea led to devastating socioeconomic and political issues in the region, as Ukraine lost parts of its territory. From the Russian perspective, Crimea was deliberated from a treacherous deal that would result in Russian natives under NATO. The detachment, therefore, had political and economic effects on Ukraine.
How Ukraine was Affected by the Annexation
The biggest consequence of Crimean annexation to Ukraine was the loss of the geopolitical and military advantage it enjoyed before the annexation. As mentioned before, Crimea is strategically positioned peninsula. With the region alienated from Ukraine, Ukraine had to reconstruct its military defense and withdraw from the region. The withdrawal made the Ukrainian government under Fedorovych Yanukovych look weak and overpowered by its neighbor. The growing tensions and frustrations against the government resulted in the ousting of the president in 2015. The people demanded a more stable and formidable government to protect its citizens from foreign invasion.
Secondly, as part of Ukraine’s territory, Sevastopol was a strategic city that housed state properties and resources. The annexation meant that Ukraine lost these state resources and, most importantly, the port infrastructure. Ukraine had invested in the Crimean Peninsula as it had massive economic impacts on the Ukrainian economy (Hale, 2018). The annexation affected many manufacturers and producers in Ukraine as they lost free access to the port, facilitating their exports. The annexation, therefore, hampered Ukraine’s trading activities which slowed down its revenue collections. These elements led the Ukrainian economy to an all-time low in the global stock exchange markets. The Ukrainian currency, the hryvnia, also suffered a blow due to the shock in the stock market.
The Crimean region is also a major energy producer and minerals contributing to 3.6% of Ukraine’s GDP. The annexation, therefore, bore imbalances in the Ukrainian national budget. Given that the Ukrainian government had invested heavily in these sectors, losing major investments in the manufacturing industry had a major impact on the economy of Ukraine. Ukraine’s iron ore and natural gas output declined by about 30%. The immediate problem was solving demarcation conflicts in the Kherson region of Ukraine, which has a gas compressor station that supplies gas to Crimea. The region sits on Ukrainian territory but is of immense significance to Crimea, which brought about tensions over how the borderline will be drawn along the 20-kilometer strip.
The annexation meant that Ukraine’s geographical size was reduced significantly hence a shrunk size, economy, and population. Furthermore, the annexation has brought about diplomatic issues between Ukraine and Crimea, such as passports and documentation. Since most people living in Crimea are connected in business practice and demographics, some families in Crimea overlapped with other regions in Ukraine, while others in Crimea owned businesses in Ukraine regions and vice versa. Therefore, citizens in Ukraine and Crimea lost some of their investments as a result.
The Crimean annexation exhibited the realism theory in international politics. By annexing Crimea, Russia exerted its complete dominance over the region, serving its national interests. The annexation was carried out as a measure to streamline Ukraine’s foreign policy of association with European and Western governments, specifically NATO, which Russia considers its enemy and would otherwise result in a lack of balance of power. Through the annexation, Russia gained control of the Crimea peninsula, which provided a strategic geopolitical presence for military action. Ukraine suffered from losing its territory, where it had many of its state resources and investments in minerals and energy resources. Indeed, the Crimean annexation resulted in instability of the social systems within Ukrainian territory.
Conclusion
The annexation of Crimea by Russia had deeply underlying diplomatic effects in the ensuing relationship between Ukraine and Russia. Russia initiated the annexation by deploying its secret military in Sevastopol to aid the Crimean forces. As a result, the Ukrainian forces withdrew and gave way to establishing Crimea as a sovereign state, despite being internationally recognized as a region under the Ukrainian state. Russia was motivated to annex Crimea from Ukraine as a response to Ukraine intensifying its association with the West, especially NATO, which would threaten Russia’s security. As such, some scholars have called for the involvement of the West in the annexation of Crimea. The close ancestral relationship between Crimeans and Russians also precipitated the desire to pull Crimea from Ukraine. The radical exploits launched by Russia had substantial benefits to Russia, particularly in terms of retaining its superiority in the region by reminding Ukraine of how much power Russia still had. Russia also benefited from the strategic landscape that Crimea has in the peninsula in terms of military stability. However, Ukraine suffered majorly in the annexation as it lost its territory, which had natural resources. This was in addition to losing its geographical vastness.
Additionally, Ukraine had some of its infrastructure and state resources in Crimea purposed towards economic production and political development within the state. The Ukrainian government of the time lost the confidence of the citizens, who demanded a new leader to retain its solidity as an independent state. In response to the annexation, Ukraine cut its ties with Crimea by banning any political and economic relationships they had, such as using its currency in Crimean banks. Citizens of Crimea, therefore, had to acquire a diplomatic clearance to cross over to Ukraine as punitive action against Crimea. As such, the annexation severed the ties between Ukraine and Crimea but drew Crimea closer to Moscow.
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