China\u2019s Social Credit System<\/p>\n
The rapid development of the Chinese Internet has significantly altered the nature of strategic interaction between political leaders and the Chinese public. While the growth of the internet has led to an increased openness and diffusion of online information, it has also been accompanied by the expansion of the party\u2019s regulatory regime on online information. The CCP has chosen to enforce this trade-off by loosening its grip over discussions about issues that do not threaten to party authority, and tightening its control over issues that have collective action potential and are deemed to threaten social stability. Scholars such as Xiao Qiang have argued that the growth of online public opinion in China signifies that the CCP can no longer maintain complete control over mass media and information, and that a power shift will eventually take place in Chinese society. <\/p>\n
While some believe that the government\u2019s tradeoff between maintaining authoritarian rule and allowing greater online freedom to facilitate economic development will inevitably lead to greater digital liberalization and political transparency, I argue that the current Chinese government has developed new tools for internet governance that may eliminate the current trade-off that is faced by the Chinese government, and allow it to pursue its objective of economic development while simultaneously enforcing greater control over online expression to prevent challenges to party authority. In the following section, I will begin by introducing the underlying trade-off between economic growth and authoritarian control that shapes the CCP\u2019s internet governance policies. Next, I will discuss the Xi Jinping administration\u2019s shift towards a more proactive and restrictive internet governance strategy, and several features of the current internet information management strategy. Lastly, I will discuss two practical applications\u2014real-name registration policies and the Social Credit program\u2014of the government\u2019s attempt to reduce the tradeoff between facilitating economic development and maintaining strict online social control, as well as implications for China\u2019s internet and the future of Chinese politics. I argue that these new internet control tools may enable the government to change the nature of strategic interaction between political leaders and the public, to the extent that leaders will be able to exploit the economic benefits of the Chinese internet while maintaining its grip on political power and online social control. <\/p>\n
Media and Internet Reform<\/p>\n
During the reform period, the CCP began to allow greater media freedom through the commercialization of mass media organizations, due to the leadership\u2019s recognition of their importance for facilitating economic development. In doing so, the government confronted a tradeoff between the authoritarian need to maintain absolute social control and the economic need to allow greater freedom of information. In addition to the economic advantages that these reforms provided, the subsequent development of online citizen discourse provided political leaders with the benefit of increased access to governance-improving information. Furthermore, the growth of the internet resulted in a shift in state-society relations, which led to greater public engagement in political issues, participatory expectations, and transparency on the part of local officials. <\/p>\n
While China had accepted that the internet was a necessary part of the modern economy, the CCP continued to view the internet as the biggest threat to authoritarian rule. The liberalization of the media and growth of the internet also brought along new challenges to maintaining social stability. The reforms were thus accompanied by the development of a sophisticated internet monitoring system, which involves an online censorship regime that allows for individual criticism but prevents collective expression, particularly, the types of collective expression that may lead to collective action against the central government. While the online content control regime has been largely effective at regulating large-scale expressions of public opinion, it is no longer able to maintain absolute control over all online expression and information.<\/p>\n
Xi Jinping Regime<\/p>\n
The current Xi administration has shifted toward an internet governance strategy that involves greater state control over online public discourse and information. Unlike the preceding Hu-Wen administration, which also exercised tight control over online content, the internet information management strategy of the Xi administration includes an aggressive new ideological campaign that aims to purify cyberspace by repressing internet rumors and public discussion that are critical of the central government. In line with government\u2019s new ideological campaign on online public opinion, the party articulated the \u201cSeven Bottom Lines of Internet Information\u201d in August 2013, which provided citizens with guidance on the boundaries of acceptable social and political discourse when releasing and discussing information online. Unlike previous governments\u2019 ex-post-facto strategy of censoring and deleting critical information that has been posted online, the \u201cSeven Bottom Lines\u201d reflect a new pre-emptive approach to compel internet users to conform their posts to the ideological requirements of the CCP. By obliging citizens to actively consider and conform their posts to the ideological requirements of the measure, the policy achieves its objective by inducing a form of self-discipline among internet users. The vagueness of the formulation of the \u201cbottom lines\u201d also adds to the difficulty of being able to distinguish the kinds of information that would violate the regulation, which further enhances the policy\u2019s effectiveness in inducing online self-censorship among citizens. <\/p>\n
The government has also established new rules regarding the punishment of netizens who release critical online opinions or false information, reflecting the Xi administration\u2019s specific concern with combating the prevalence of online rumors. In 2013, a judicial interpretation issued by the Chinese Supreme People\u2019s Court and Supreme People\u2019s Procuratorate stated that individuals can be imprisoned for up to three years for posting false information online, if that information is viewed more than 5,000 times or re-tweeted 500 times. As views and re-posts cannot be controlled by individual internet users, Chinese netizens are forced to more closely consider whether their posts are morally acceptable in the eyes of the government before releasing them online. Like the \u201cSeven Bottom Lines,\u201d these rules create greater pressures on citizens to practice self-censorship to conform with the party\u2019s ideological line. <\/p>\n
A prominent feature of Xi\u2019s internet governance regime is the emphasis it places on guiding public opinion. Unlike previous efforts to determine what can and cannot be discussed by directly promoting or repressing public opinion based on its ideologically-soundness, guidance of public opinion focuses on indirectly influencing the way that people should think about contemporary issues. While guidance of public opinion has been an important element of party propaganda work since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the Xi leadership has adopted this strategy as part of a more proactive approach to regulating online behavior, as past experiences have shown that the older strategy of direct repression of online expression was no longer effective at controlling and shaping public opinion. Official government microblogs have effectively carried out the role of guiding public opinion, employing warm and personable rhetoric to distract citizens\u2019 attention away from criticizing the government\u2019s shortcomings on hot-button issues, and directing attention toward the suffering of the victims at hand and the need for collective sympathy on the part of the public. <\/p>\n
These features of the Xi leadership\u2019s internet governance policy reveal a distinct shift in the Chinese government\u2019s willingness to give up authoritarian control over online behavior for the economic objective of improving freedom of information online. This new regime is characterized by increased efforts to control the dissemination of online information and public opinion on microblogging sites, the tightening of boundaries of acceptable online discourse, the adoption of a more proactive approach to regulating online behavior through self-discipline, and most importantly, a strategy for controlling public opinion and online behavior that relies not on explicit repression techniques, but rather on indirect methods to shape the angles through which citizens think about certain issues. <\/p>\n
Word Count: 1372<\/p>\n
This rough draft includes only the first portion of my paper, here is a brief outline of the rest of my paper:<\/p>\n
Introduction<\/p>\n
Media and Internet Reform<\/p>\n
Xi Jinping Regime <\/p>\n
Real-name registration policies <\/p>\n
Chinese officials are ambivalent toward the trade-off between authoritarian control and media freedom<\/p>\n
Reason: information access increases the risks of anti-government collective action<\/p>\n
Anonymity in numbers reduces risks of collective action for citizens<\/p>\n
Real-name registration eliminates citizens\u2019 ability to collectively organize facing repercussions from the government <\/p>\n
Social Credit System<\/p>\n
Description<\/p>\n
Implementation\/Predictions<\/p>\n
SCS enables the CCP embed its two main goals for the citizenry (economic efficiency and social obedience) in a single incentive system<\/p>\n
Result: There is no longer a trade-off between economic and political objectives in enforcing internet governance policies.<\/p>\n
Result: May strengthen authoritarian resilience.<\/p>\n
Conclusion<\/p>\n
Summary<\/p>\n
Predictions<\/p>\n
Implications<\/p>\n
Works Cited<\/p>\n
Creemers, Rogier. \u201cThe Pivot in Chinese Cybergovernance: Integrating Internet Control in Xi <\/p>\n
Jinping\u2019s China.\u201d French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, No. 4 (104) <\/p>\n
(2015): 5-13.<\/p>\n
Deng, Y. and O\u2019Brien, Kevin J. \u201cRelational Repression in China: Using Social Ties to <\/p>\n
Demobilize Protestors.\u201d The China Quarterly, August 2013: 1-20. <\/p>\n
Denyer, Simon. \u201cChina wants to give all of its citizens a score \u2013 and their rating could affect <\/p>\n
every area of their lives.\u201d Independent, October 22, 2016.<\/p>\n
Heilmann, S. and Stepan, Matthais. \u201cChina\u2019s Core Executive: Leadership styles, structures, and <\/p>\n
processes under Xi Jinping.\u201d Mercator Institute for China Studies, No. 1 June 2016: 1-<\/p>\n
100.<\/p>\n
King, Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. \u201cHow Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism <\/p>\n
but Silences Collective Expression.\u201d American Political Science Review, May (2013): 1-<\/p>\n
18. <\/p>\n
Li, Angela Ke. \u201cTowards a More Proactive Method: Regulating Public Opinion on Chinese <\/p>\n
Microblogs under Xi\u2019s New Leadership.\u201d Chinese Perspectives, No. 4(104) (2015): 15-<\/p>\n
23. <\/p>\n
Lee, Jyh-An. \u201cReal-Name Registration Rules and the Fading Digital Anonymity in China.\u201d The <\/p>\n
Chinese University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 2016-06: 1-35.<\/p>\n
Walton, Greg. \u201cChina\u2019s Golden Shield Corporations and the Development of Surveillance <\/p>\n
Technology in the People\u2019s Republic of China.\u201d International Centre for Human Rights <\/p>\n
and Democratic Development, 2011: 1-36. <\/p>\n
Shirk, Susan L. Changing Media, Changing China. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.<\/p>\n
Su, Catherine, \u201cData from Alibaba\u2019s E-Commerce Sites is now Powering a Credit-Scoring <\/p>\n
System.\u201d TechCrunch, January 27, 2015. <\/p>\n
Vesey, Dustin. \u201cChina Scores Its People.\u201d China Hands Magazine, November 2, 2016.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
China\u2019s Social Credit System The rapid development of the Chinese Internet has significantly altered the nature of strategic interaction between political leaders and the Chinese public. While the growth of the internet has led to an increased openness and diffusion of online information, it has also been accompanied by the expansion of the party\u2019s regulatory […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[10],"class_list":["post-105935","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-research-paper-writing","tag-writing"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/105935","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=105935"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/105935\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=105935"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=105935"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=105935"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}