Ross<\/p>\n
Firm Project<\/p>\n
Team D<\/p>\n
Derar Yaghi, Karime Gonzalez, Phuong Nguyen<\/p>\n
FINA 5318 NB<\/p>\n
Dr. Cheng<\/p>\n
November 12, 2021<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Table of Contents<\/p>\n
Overview\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026.. 2<\/p>\n
Background\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026….2-6<\/p>\n
Corporate Governance\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…. 5<\/p>\n
Competition\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u20266-7<\/p>\n
Effects of the Pandemic\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.8-9<\/p>\n
Ratio analysis for ROSS for three years and industry average\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.10-11<\/p>\n
Financial Statement\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026….12<\/p>\n
Income Statement\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026….12<\/p>\n
Balance Sheet\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…… 12<\/p>\n
Return on Equity\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.12<\/p>\n
Statement of Cash Flow\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026….. 13<\/p>\n
Debt Analysis\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 13<\/p>\n
Ratio Analysis\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026….. 14<\/p>\n
Common Size Analysis and percentage analysis\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.15-16<\/p>\n
DUPONT equation\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.17-18<\/p>\n
COVID effect on sales\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026….18-19<\/p>\n
SWOT analysis on Ross\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026……….20<\/p>\n
References\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…21-22<\/p>\n
Appendix 1\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..23-26<\/p>\n
Appendix 2\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..27-29<\/p>\n
Overview<\/p>\n
The apparel market in 2019 worldwide is over 1.9 Trillion US dollars and over $3.67 billion in the United States Shahbandeh (2021).\u00a0 In 2019, about $268 billion came from stores and about $100 billion from ecommerce Shahbandeh (2021).\u00a0 This year it seems that the apparel industry is recovering and it will increase by about 10%.\u00a0 Also, it is very interesting to know that 46% of all apparel comes from ecommerce.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Background<\/p>\n
Ross Stores, Inc. operates under its brand name of Ross Dress for Less, which is an American discounted price retail chain that started in 1950 in San Bruno, California by Morris Ross Bill Isackson and currently holds its headquarters in Dublin, California. The company had started out as a department store but then changed the format of the company to off-price retail units after Isackson had sold the company to William Isackson in 1958. After acquiring the company, William Isackson, had opened six more Ross Stores in San Bruno, Pacifica, Novato, Vacaville, Redwood City and Castro Valley.\u00a0<\/p>\n
In 1982, Isackson then sold the Ross Stores chain of six stores to Mervin Morris, who was the founder of the Mervyns chain of department stores and a group of investors. After acquiring Ross, Morris and the group of investors decided to change the format of the company from a department store to a discount chain that sells off-retail units. Within three years of changing the company, Ross Stores had rapidly expanded to more than 100 stores under the supervision of Stuart G. Moldaw and Don Rowlett. Ross Stores now carries products that include branded apparel, accessories, footwear, and home accessories with savings of 20% to 60% on everyday items.<\/p>\n
Ross Stores, Inc. then went public with it’s IPO in August of 1985 trading on NASDAQ under the symbol \u201cROST\u201d. Their sales had grown rapidly and by the end of the fiscal year of 1986, they had a total of $534 million in total sales and had expanded to 16 states with over 120 stores. The physical growth of the company was due to leadership of Moldaw and Rowlett that went by their acquisition strategy of acquiring existing stores within strip malls and free-standing locations that were abandoned by other retailers. During the early 1980s, Moldaw and Rowlett recognized the rising popularity of off-price retail stores along the East Coast and Midwest. They wanted to capitalize on the growing popularity, so they planned on saturating the market in California before rival off-price retail chains.<\/p>\n
Ross Stores, Inc. had suffered its first setback in 1986. They were forced to shut down 25 unprofitable stores located mainly in Texas and Oklahoma, where the economic conditions had crumpled Ross Profits. Within a year, Ross had reported a $41.1 million loss which $39.4 million of the loss came from the Texas and Oklahoma stores that were shut down. Along with the closure of Ross stores, the company had also lost one of it’s chiefs when Rowlett resigned from the company in 1987.<\/p>\n
Not long after the departure of Rowlett, the company veteran, Norman A. Ferber, who was serving as Ross\u2019 executive vice president of merchandising, marketing, and distribution, was appointed as Ross\u2019 president, COO, and CEO. After the $40 million loss in 1986, Moldaw and Ferber had cut back on expansion in 1987 and had focused mainly on expanding in three principal markets: the West Coast, the Washington area, and Florida. In hopes of rescuing the company, they had eliminated the domestic department in Ross Stores and had also added cosmetics and fragrance departments as well as adding high-end clothing to their merchandising mix. By the end of 1987, Ross had a gain of $11.5 million after the loss of more than $40 million the year before. Prior to the 1990s, Ross, as well as many other off-price retailers, did not try to departmentalize its floor space into merchandising categories. Years leading into the 1990s, Ross utilized partitions to delineate the various departments from one another. Another change that Ross took to help reshape the company was a refocused inventory strategy. They were stocking a smaller variety of merchandise but supporting their supply of merchandise lines that remained, which helped create a more narrow and deeper inventory for stock.<\/p>\n
With their new changes, Ross ranked as the third-largest off-price retailer in the country in the beginning of 1989. The company then announced their goals to open 100 to 150 stores within the next five years. They could achieve this goal by increasing their stores from 20-25 per year; the annual sales had reached over $1 billion by 1992. As sales were rising, Moldaw and Ferber began testing the market for a \u201cHome Accent\u201d department, which was a success. By 1993, nearly all of its existing stores contained a Home Accent department. By the end of 1995, Ross was collecting almost $1.5 billion annually in sales.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Even though the company had experienced a national recession, the company had prepared with new management that had reorganized the whole company with new strategies that had helped the company recover. Ferber was then replaced by Michael Balmuth in 1996 as the company’s new Chief Executive Officer, who then continued to take Ross forward with justifiable strong expectations for consistency.<\/p>\n
Under Ross Stores, Inc. the company had then decided to open a new off-price chain called DD Discounts in 2004. DD Discounts begin with the thought of reaching consumers with household incomes of $30,000-$40,000. DD Discounts offers more merchandise that is less about the brands but more about the low prices and bigger selection of items compared to Ross Stores. Ross Stores has now opened more than 280 stores in 21 states.<\/p>\n
Corporate Governance\u00a0<\/p>\n
Ross board of directors has 11 members which most of them are independent from the company according to their website.\u00a0 The company has audits which helps the board to have oversight and ensures the integrity of the accounting practices.\u00a0 There is also a nominating and corporate governance committee that helps find qualified people to serve on the Board of directors as well as help with establishing guidelines for the company\u2019s corporate governance.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Competition<\/p>\n
\u00a0Ross Stores is in the industry for off-price retail where the principal competitive factors include major discounts on brand name merchandise, offering an assortment of products,and providing a store environment that is convenient and easy to navigate. Ross Stores faces a challenging market as retailers are increasing competition for business from specialty stores to discount stores to manufacturer-owned outlet stores. We also see competition through e-commerce stores that sell off-price apparel and home fashion, and as we see today, more and more consumers are choosing to buy online rather than in-store.<\/p>\n
Some major competitors of Ross Stores would be TJX companies ( which includes TJ Maxx, Marshalls, and Homegoods), Burlington Stores ( Burlington Coat Factory) ,Nordstrom rack, and Saks OFF 5th, which is the off-price retailer for Saks Fifth Avenue. The number one competitor for Ross would be TJX Companies as both companies have been consistently able to grow revenue each year without losing ground to one another but gaining customers from the out of date and declining traditional department stores such as Sears and JCPenney.<\/p>\n
The one thing that separates Ross Stores from TJX Companies is that Ross Stores are able to offer high-quality products for extreme discounts and more than that of TJX Companies and any of their other competitors.<\/p>\n
The first graph is interesting because it shows the percentage sales from each category.\u00a0 The two biggest categories are the home accent at 28% and the ladies clothes at 23%.\u00a0 The second graph shows how Ross is beating its competitors and doing much better in 2018 than JCPenney and Macys combined in percentage growth.<\/p>\n
Effect of the Pandemic<\/p>\n
Due to the ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, Ross Stores, as well as major retailers, have been severely affected. Ross Stores had to close all of their locations in late March 2020 due to pandemic, leaving them with no sources of revenue as they relied heavily on consumer sales face to face. Due to the government orders as well as the rise of COVID-19, the company did not know when they would be able to reopen therefore leaving the company furloughing the majority of their workers as well as implementing other expense reduction in early April of 2020. As a result, the sales have plummeted about 50% year over year in the first quarter which ended in early May. Ross stores were then able to reopen their stores mid-May, with almost all stores in operation by the end of June.<\/p>\n
Even with only a few months of closure, Ross had reported that sales fell 33%. Because of the stores’ closures, it had left all off-price retailers to end their first quarters with a big inventory of unsold inventory, which then led to big inventory write-downs at the end of quarter 1. But by late June, the inventory had turned completely opposite as sales were outpacing the expectations for the reopening of the stores. Ross stores had reported a pretax loss of $413 million and a net loss of $284 million for the first half of the year. The company had seen a fluctuation in sales as a substantial number of consumers were limiting or avoiding shopping trips due to the pandemic and store traffic remained low. Demand for purchases of apparel and home accessories had also slowed down as the economy was in decline. Ross Stores as well as other retailers had continued to see a decline until the creation and administration of the vaccine.<\/p>\n
Ross Stores, Inc. had made an official statement on their website, \u201cGiven the unprecedented economic disruption created by his health crisis, management had already implemented measures to reduce expenses and increase financial liquidity and flexibility. However, with limited visibility on when it’s stores will reopen, the company is now taking additional actions to further enhance liquidity and strengthen its ability to manage through these challenging times\u201d. Barbara Rentler, Chief Executive Officer, had commented on the furloughed employees stating that Ross will continue to pay the employee portion of premiums for those who are furloughed that are currently receiving health benefits as well as they will be eligible to apply for unemployment benefits.<\/p>\n
Since the reopening of Ross and DD Discounts stores in June 2020 until now, sales have slowly been increasing and will continue to increase as the holiday season is around the corner.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
ROSS CEO – Barbara Rentler<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Ratio analysis for ROSS for three years and industry average\u00a0<\/p>\n
Year End<\/p>\n
\u00a0Feb 2, 2019<\/p>\n
Year End<\/p>\n
\u00a0Feb 1, 2020<\/p>\n
Year end<\/p>\n
January 30,\u00a0 2021<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
2019<\/p>\n
2020<\/p>\n
2021<\/p>\n
Industry<\/p>\n
\u00a0average<\/p>\n
Current<\/p>\n
1.7<\/p>\n
1.3<\/p>\n
1.7<\/p>\n
1.3<\/p>\n
Quick<\/p>\n
0.8<\/p>\n
0.6<\/p>\n
1.3<\/p>\n
1.3<\/p>\n
Inventory Turnover<\/p>\n
6.1<\/p>\n
6.3<\/p>\n
6.5<\/p>\n
4.8<\/p>\n
Days Sales Outstanding<\/p>\n
2.4<\/p>\n
2.3<\/p>\n
3.4<\/p>\n
5.9<\/p>\n
Fixed assets turnover<\/p>\n
5.6<\/p>\n
2.7<\/p>\n
2.1<\/p>\n
1.7<\/p>\n
Total assets turnover<\/p>\n
2.5<\/p>\n
1.7<\/p>\n
1.0<\/p>\n
1.0<\/p>\n
Debt Ratio<\/p>\n
12.5%<\/p>\n
35.2%<\/p>\n
43.4%<\/p>\n
41.49%<\/p>\n
Liabilities to assets ratio<\/p>\n
45.6%<\/p>\n
64.1%<\/p>\n
74.1%<\/p>\n
90.34%<\/p>\n
TIE<\/p>\n
-200.8<\/p>\n
-118.5<\/p>\n
2.3<\/p>\n
41.1<\/p>\n
EBIT coverage<\/p>\n
4.7<\/p>\n
5.9<\/p>\n
1.2<\/p>\n
0.8<\/p>\n
Profit margin<\/p>\n
10.6%<\/p>\n
10.4%<\/p>\n
0.7%<\/p>\n
-2.13%<\/p>\n
Basic Earning Power<\/p>\n
33.6%<\/p>\n
23.0%<\/p>\n
1.5%<\/p>\n
20.20%<\/p>\n
ROA<\/p>\n
26.1%<\/p>\n
17.8%<\/p>\n
0.7%<\/p>\n
-2.07%<\/p>\n
ROE<\/p>\n
48.0%<\/p>\n
49.4%<\/p>\n
2.6%<\/p>\n
-15.30%<\/p>\n
Price\/Earnings Ratio(P\/E)<\/p>\n
24.1<\/p>\n
24.3<\/p>\n
39.58<\/p>\n
-10.9<\/p>\n
Price\/cash flow<\/p>\n
24.1<\/p>\n
24.3<\/p>\n
39.58<\/p>\n
34.7<\/p>\n
Market\/Book<\/p>\n
11.6<\/p>\n
12.0<\/p>\n
10.3<\/p>\n
18.8<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0The table above shows the ratios for Ross for the years Jan 30th, 2021, Feb 1st, 2020 and Feb 2nd, 2019.\u00a0 It also compares it with the industry average.\u00a0 To get to the industry average we calculated the ratios for three of its closest competitors, which are Nordstrom, TJX and Burlington coat factory.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
Financial Statement<\/p>\n
Income Statement<\/p>\n
A quick look at the income statement shows that Ross in 2019 and 2020 was very profitable and higher than the industry average.\u00a0 In 2021 profit declined because of COVID and Ross closed all its stores and turned into selling some products online.\u00a0 However, the profit was still positive compared to the industry average of -2.13%.\u00a0 Another reason for the decline in Ross\u2019s profit is the big interest payment that they had in 2021 compared to no interest for the previous two years.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Balance Sheet<\/p>\n
The balance sheet shows that the current liabilities in 2021 increased by 44%.\u00a0 Long term debt increased in 2021 to 682.4% which shows that ROSS took on a big loan to be able to pay for its expenses.\u00a0 Total liabilities also increased by 57.4%.\u00a0 All of this is not too good for the company because it shows that it took on too much debt to pay for its operations.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Return on Equity<\/p>\n
Return on equity shows how much stockholders make on their investment and the profit generated from the equity.\u00a0 Ross\u2019s ROE is higher than the industry which is at 48% for 2019 and 49.4% for 2020 and then it took a big dip in 2021 and the ROE is at a low 2.6%.\u00a0 Ross was doing so good before the pandemic but got affected by COVID just like any other company in the industry. Even though ROSS decreased a lot in 2021 it was still above industry average.\u00a0 So given the competitors it is still better for investors to invest in this company rather than other garment companies.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Statement of Cash Flow\u00a0<\/p>\n
The statement of the free cash flow isn\u2019t good for the company.\u00a0 IT shows both a negative cash flow in 2020 and in 2021 and this might be the reason the company took on a lot of debt as mentioned earlier to pay for its operations and expenses.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Debt Analysis\u00a0<\/p>\n
The debt ratio is higher than the industry average which isn\u2019t good.\u00a0 Of course the lower the debt ratio is the better it is for the company.\u00a0 The debt ratio in 2019 was 12.5%, then it went up to 35.2% in 2020 and again increased to 43.4% in 2021.\u00a0 This means that the debt ratio increased almost 4 fold than it was in 2019.\u00a0 This of course had a negative effect on the cash flow.\u00a0 Again the liabilities to assets ratio is very high and it increased from 45.6% in 2019 to over 74% in 2021.\u00a0 This meansT and it shows in the balance sheet that the company had to take on a lot of debt.\u00a0 Also, another indicator is the TIE which is below industry average\u00a0 which is not good because it means that the company might be at a disadvantage to pay off its interest.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Ratio Analysis<\/p>\n
The current ratio for Ross is better than the industry average and it is higher than the ratio in 2020.\u00a0 This is good for managers and creditors because they like to see the company paying its bills on time. But it might not be as good for stockholders because they might see it as tying up too much money in inventory.\u00a0 The current ratio is the same as the industry average so it means that the company is as liquid as the industry average which is good.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0The inventory turnover is better than the industry average which means that the company Ross is not keeping large inventories on hand.\u00a0 The DOS is lower than the industry average which is also good because it means that the company collects its cash quickly.\u00a0 Fixed assets turnover is higher than the industry average which means that the sales are high enough to support the money invested in assets.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0The EBITDA coverage is the ability of the company to cover its financial obligations.\u00a0 The higher the EBITDA coverage the better it is.\u00a0 The EBITDA coverage by 2021 is above industry average.\u00a0 The EBITA is a better indicator than the TIE because interest is not the only financial charge that the company pays.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
The profit margin for Ross is higher than the industry average which is good.\u00a0 The higher the profit margin is, the better the company is doing.\u00a0 The profit margin for the industry is negative and this is one of the effects of COVID it affected many businesses negatively.\u00a0 The BEP is the earning power for a company and the higher the better. The BEP in 2021 is much lower than the industry average which means that the company has suffered a lot because of COVID.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
The ROA is the return on assets which is above industry average.\u00a0 This is good for Ross since it is performing better than the industry average on almost all the ratios.\u00a0 The ROE is the return stockholders have on their investments and the higher the ROE the better it is.\u00a0 Ross\u2019s ROE is higher than the industry average but lower than the previous years.\u00a0 We can\u2019t emphasize the big effect of COVID that affected the businesses negatively.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
The P\/E ratio in 2021 is $39.58 which is higher than the industry average.\u00a0 This means that stockholders are willing to pay $39.58 for each dollar of profit.\u00a0 If P\/E is higher than the market average as it is in this example that means that investing in the firm is good.\u00a0 The price\/cash flow is also $39.58 which is higher than the market average.\u00a0 This is good for the company because it means that the growth prospects are above average.\u00a0 The company is a better position for investment than other companies.\u00a0 The market\/book ratio for the firm in 2021 is 10.3 which is below the industry average of 18.8.\u00a0 This shows that investors are willing to pay for the company\u2019s book value.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Common Size Analysis and percentage analysis<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
We find out from the common size analysis that net fixed assets decreased in 2021 compared to 2020 and of course depreciation also decreased in 2021 compared to 2020.\u00a0 Long term debt in 2021 will increase a lot which might explain a lot of the financial difficulties of the company.\u00a0 It increased from 3.35% in 2020 to 19.25% in 2021 which explains the more than $2 million dollars the company took on as debt in 2021.\u00a0 This also increased the total liabilities from 64.07% in 2020 to 74.13% in 2021.\u00a0 The total common equity decreased from 54.13% in 2019 to almost half 25.87% in 2021.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
From the income statement there was an improvement in the cost of goods sold.\u00a0 It went down from 99.7% to 92.9% which improved the EBIT which went up from 0.299% in 2020 to 7.14% in 2021.\u00a0 This led to a net profit in 2021 of 3.6% after the company reported a loss in 2020 of -1.63%.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
A quick look at the percentage change analysis shows that in 2021\u00a0 the cash and equivalent went up to 248% which means that there was a lot of increase in cash and its equivalents.\u00a0 Long term assets have a big increase in 2020 and 2021 and this is because there was an increase in the amount invested in long term assets.\u00a0 Long term liabilities also increased in 2021 compared to 2019 and this is because the company took on more debt.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
The DuPont System<\/p>\n
Profit margin<\/p>\n
TA Turnover<\/p>\n
Equity Multiplier<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
NI\/Sales<\/p>\n
Sales\/TA<\/p>\n
TA\/CE<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
2019<\/p>\n
10.6<\/p>\n
2.5<\/p>\n
1.8<\/p>\n
48%<\/p>\n
2020<\/p>\n
10.4<\/p>\n
1.7<\/p>\n
2.8<\/p>\n
49.4%<\/p>\n
2021<\/p>\n
0.7<\/p>\n
1<\/p>\n
3.9<\/p>\n
2.6%<\/p>\n
Industry average<\/p>\n
-2.13%<\/p>\n
1<\/p>\n
7.2<\/p>\n
-15.3%<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Improved<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
DUPONT equation<\/p>\n
The DuPont equation gives a quick look at all the ratios together and it shows that 2020 was the best year according to the DuPont ratio.\u00a0 However, if you look at the Profit margin in 2019 was the best because it is 10.6% which is much higher than the industry average and more than 2021 which was 0.7%.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
COVID effect on sales<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
You can see from net sales that sales were around $15m in 2019 and went up to $16m in 2020.\u00a0 However, sales dropped in 2021 to $12.5 m which is a decrease of more than 21%.\u00a0 This is also true for the main competitors such as Burlington coat factory there sales dropped from $7.2 Billion in 2020 to $5.764 in 2021.\u00a0 Remember that 2021 is really just the end of 2020 but the accounting year ends in January of 2021.\u00a0 Burlington suffered a loss of about 20% in 2021.\u00a0 Nordstrom did even worse with sales dropping from $15.5 Billion in 2020 to $10.7 Billion a decrease of about 31%.\u00a0 TJX sales dropped from $41.7 billion in 2020 to $32.13 in 2021 a decrease of 23%.\u00a0 These bad revenue numbers across the industry can only be explained by COVID and unemployment.\u00a0 At the beginning of COVID sales went up in many of these stores because of the stimulus checks and people didn\u2019t think that COVID would last this long, but after that you can see the effect in 2020 sales across all the stores dropped from 20% to 31%.\u00a0 Ross overall outperformed the competitors and the sales dropped less than its competitors.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
According to Brydges,et.al. (2020), COVID put a strain on the apparel industry with some stores closing, a big disruption to the global production and some inventory that was not sold.\u00a0 Eventually the industry had to take a loss of billions of dollars because of the impact of COVID Brydges,et.al. (2020). They conclude that the lasting impact of COVID on the apparel industry is still to be seen.\u00a0 It is on the news all day that the ports in the USA can\u2019t unload the cargo that it has on the ships and more and more shortages of drivers and workers are needed.\u00a0 Our personal opinion is that the industry will recover fully but might take a couple of years to go back to normal.<\/p>\n
You can tell by having a quick look at this chart that ROSS outperformed the industry average in almost every category.\u00a0 The industry outperformed Ross in two major categories; the TIE and the Market\/book value.\u00a0 The TIE is an indicator of the company\u2019s ability to pay off it\u2019s interest. ROSS is below industry average when it comes to paying off its interest, however, the interest on ROSS is only $83,000.\u00a0 This doesn\u2019t seem like a large amount to pay off.\u00a0 The Market\/Book value shows the willingness from investors to pay for the book value.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
SWOT analysis on Ross<\/p>\n
\u00a0 Strength<\/p>\n
\u00a0\u00a0Good cash flow and it shows with the higher than average profit<\/p>\n
\u00a0\u00a0Low prices for a well known brand<\/p>\n
\u00a0\u00a0Ross has more than 1500 stores<\/p>\n
Ross doesn\u2019t only offer clothing, they offer bedding and houseware<\/p>\n
They are good at producing new products<\/p>\n
Weakness<\/p>\n
\u00a0Currently no stores outside of USA<\/p>\n
\u00a0Because customers look for low prices and deals, there is not much brand loyalty<\/p>\n
Not good into expanding in new products other than the ones currently offering<\/p>\n
Opportunity<\/p>\n
\u00a0Expand to other countries<\/p>\n
Be more competitive with online stores<\/p>\n
\u00a0Be creative with offering different discounts to different customers online VS store customers<\/p>\n
Threats<\/p>\n
\u00a0\u00a0There is still a shortage in producing products<\/p>\n
\u00a0\u00a0So many compatriots<\/p>\n
\u00a0\u00a0Even supermarkets offer customers garments<\/p>\n
\u00a0Some customers like to buy fake products because it is cheaper<\/p>\n
\u00a0The minimum hourly rate if it goes up to $15\/hour<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
References<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Brydges, T., Retamal, M., & Hanlon, M. (2020). Will COVID-19 support the transition to a more sustainable fashion industry? Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy, 16(1), 298\u2013308. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/15487733.2020.1829848<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Strategic Management Department. (n.d.). Ross Stores SWOT Analysis Matrix (Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities, Threats). Fern Fort University. http:\/\/fernfortuniversity.com\/term-papers\/swot\/1433\/237-ross-stores.php<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Ross Stores (Ross Dress For Less). CompaniesHistory.com – The largest companies and brands in the world. (2021, May 1). Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https:\/\/www.companieshistory.com\/ross-stores-ross-dress-for-less\/.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Overview. Ross Stores, Inc. (n.d.). Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https:\/\/investors.rossstores.com\/historical-highlights-0.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Ross Stores, Inc.. FundingUniverse. (n.d.). Retrieved October 24, 2021, from http:\/\/www.fundinguniverse.com\/company-histories\/ross-stores-inc-history\/.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Torres, B. (2016, August 15). Ross’ DD’s discount chain growing up. East Bay Times. Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https:\/\/www.eastbaytimes.com\/2007\/03\/22\/ross-dds-discount-chain-growing-up\/.<\/p>\n
Ross Stores Inc ‘s. CSIMarket. (n.d.). Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https:\/\/csimarket.com\/stocks\/compet_glance.php?code=ROST.<\/p>\n
What drives Ross Stores’ success (NASDAQ:Rost). SeekingAlpha. (n.d.). Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https:\/\/seekingalpha.com\/article\/3307255-what-drives-ross-stores-success.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Levine-Weinberg, A. (2020, September 2). Ross Stores and Burlington Struggle through covid-19. The Motley Fool. Retrieved October 25, 2021, from https:\/\/www.fool.com\/investing\/2020\/09\/02\/ross-stores-and-burlington-struggle-through-covid\/.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Ross Stores provides additional COVID-19 Business Update. Ross Stores, Inc. (n.d.). Retrieved October 25, 2021, from https:\/\/investors.rossstores.com\/news-releases\/news-release-details\/ross-stores-provides-additional-covid-19-business-update.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Shahbandeh, M. (2021, April 26). U.S. apparel market – statistics & facts. Statista. https:\/\/www.statista.com\/topics\/965\/apparel-market-in-the-us\/#dossierKeyfigu<\/p>\n
Appendix 1<\/p>\n
Common Size Analysis<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Balance Sheets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Cash and equivalents<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
23.26%<\/p>\n
14.45%<\/p>\n
37.89%<\/p>\n
Prepaid expenses and others<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
2.37%<\/p>\n
1.57%<\/p>\n
1.96%<\/p>\n
Accounts receivable<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
1.59%<\/p>\n
1.09%<\/p>\n
0.90%<\/p>\n
Inventories<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
28.82%<\/p>\n
19.60%<\/p>\n
11.87%<\/p>\n
Total current assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
56.05%<\/p>\n
36.72%<\/p>\n
52.62%<\/p>\n
Land and Building<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
18.54%<\/p>\n
12.59%<\/p>\n
9.33%<\/p>\n
Fixtures & Equipment<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
45.82%<\/p>\n
33.32%<\/p>\n
25.50%<\/p>\n
Leasehold Improvements<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
19.36%<\/p>\n
13.05%<\/p>\n
10.05%<\/p>\n
Long term assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
3.20%<\/p>\n
34.89%<\/p>\n
26.06%<\/p>\n
Construction in Progress<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
2.82%<\/p>\n
2.03%<\/p>\n
2.96%<\/p>\n
Gross Fixed Assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
89.75%<\/p>\n
95.88%<\/p>\n
73.91%<\/p>\n
Less Accumulated Dep.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
45.80%<\/p>\n
32.61%<\/p>\n
26.53%<\/p>\n
Net Fixed Assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
43.95%<\/p>\n
63.28%<\/p>\n
47.38%<\/p>\n
Total Assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
100.00%<\/p>\n
100.00%<\/p>\n
100.00%<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Liabilities and equity<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Accounts payable<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
19.38%<\/p>\n
13.87%<\/p>\n
17.75%<\/p>\n
Accrued expenses<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
7.11%<\/p>\n
4.94%<\/p>\n
4.66%<\/p>\n
Accrued payroll and benefits<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
5.98%<\/p>\n
3.90%<\/p>\n
3.15%<\/p>\n
Cuurent operating lease liabilities<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
6.04%<\/p>\n
4.70%<\/p>\n
Income taxes payable<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.62%<\/p>\n
0.15%<\/p>\n
0.43%<\/p>\n
Total current liabilities<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
33.09%<\/p>\n
28.90%<\/p>\n
30.68%<\/p>\n
Long-term debt<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
5.14%<\/p>\n
3.35%<\/p>\n
19.25%<\/p>\n
Other long term liabilities<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
7.34%<\/p>\n
31.82%<\/p>\n
24.19%<\/p>\n
Total liabilities<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
45.57%<\/p>\n
64.07%<\/p>\n
74.13%<\/p>\n
Paid in capital<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
22.65%<\/p>\n
15.60%<\/p>\n
12.42%<\/p>\n
Treasury Stock<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
-6.14%<\/p>\n
-4.64%<\/p>\n
-3.76%<\/p>\n
Common stock (100,000 shares)<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.06%<\/p>\n
0.04%<\/p>\n
0.03%<\/p>\n
Retained earnings<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
37.85%<\/p>\n
24.93%<\/p>\n
17.19%<\/p>\n
Total common equity<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
54.43%<\/p>\n
35.93%<\/p>\n
25.87%<\/p>\n
Total liabilities and equity<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
100.00%<\/p>\n
100.00%<\/p>\n
100.00%<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Net sales<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
100.000%<\/p>\n
100.000%<\/p>\n
100.000%<\/p>\n
Costs of Goods Sold Except Depr.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
71.587%<\/p>\n
71.926%<\/p>\n
78.510%<\/p>\n
General and administrative<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
14.793%<\/p>\n
14.694%<\/p>\n
19.976%<\/p>\n
Total Operating Cost<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
86.380%<\/p>\n
86.619%<\/p>\n
98.486%<\/p>\n
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)<\/p>\n
13.620%<\/p>\n
13.381%<\/p>\n
1.514%<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Less interest<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
-0.068%<\/p>\n
-0.113%<\/p>\n
0.666%<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Pre-tax earnings<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
13.688%<\/p>\n
13.494%<\/p>\n
0.848%<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Provision for tax on earnings<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
3.093%<\/p>\n
3.138%<\/p>\n
0.167%<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Net Income before preferred dividends<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
10.595%<\/p>\n
10.356%<\/p>\n
0.681%<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Income Statements<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Net sales<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
100.000%<\/p>\n
100.000%<\/p>\n
100.000%<\/p>\n
Costs of Goods Sold Except Depr.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
83.450%<\/p>\n
85.356%<\/p>\n
82.438%<\/p>\n
Depreciation and amortization<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.551%<\/p>\n
2.005%<\/p>\n
1.706%<\/p>\n
Other Expenses<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
9.907%<\/p>\n
12.341%<\/p>\n
8.712%<\/p>\n
Total Operating Cost<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
93.907%<\/p>\n
99.701%<\/p>\n
92.856%<\/p>\n
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
6.093%<\/p>\n
0.299%<\/p>\n
7.144%<\/p>\n
Less interest<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
1.821%<\/p>\n
3.017%<\/p>\n
1.137%<\/p>\n
Pre-tax earnings<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
4.272%<\/p>\n
-2.718%<\/p>\n
6.007%<\/p>\n
Taxes (40%)<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
1.709%<\/p>\n
-1.087%<\/p>\n
2.403%<\/p>\n
Net Income before preferred dividends<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
2.563%<\/p>\n
-1.631%<\/p>\n
3.604%<\/p>\n
\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
Appendix 2<\/p>\n
Percentage change analysis<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Balance Sheets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Cash and equivalents<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
-4.37%<\/p>\n
241.09%<\/p>\n
Prepaid expenses and others<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
2.15%<\/p>\n
73.08%<\/p>\n
Accounts receivable<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
5.71%<\/p>\n
18.98%<\/p>\n
Inventories<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
4.68%<\/p>\n
-13.79%<\/p>\n
Total current assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
0.85%<\/p>\n
96.61%<\/p>\n
Land and Building<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
4.55%<\/p>\n
5.42%<\/p>\n
Fixtures & Equipment<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
11.92%<\/p>\n
16.53%<\/p>\n
Leasehold Improvements<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
3.73%<\/p>\n
8.69%<\/p>\n
Long term assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
1577.42%<\/p>\n
1604.56%<\/p>\n
Construction in Progress<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
10.49%<\/p>\n
119.24%<\/p>\n
Gross Fixed Assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
64.43%<\/p>\n
72.43%<\/p>\n
Less Accumulated Dep.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
9.58%<\/p>\n
21.30%<\/p>\n
Net Fixed Assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
121.58%<\/p>\n
125.70%<\/p>\n
Total Assets<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
53.92%<\/p>\n
109.39%<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Liabilities and equity<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Accounts payable<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
10.14%<\/p>\n
91.74%<\/p>\n
Accrued expenses<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
7.07%<\/p>\n
37.19%<\/p>\n
Accrued payroll and benefits<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
0.39%<\/p>\n
10.26%<\/p>\n
Cuurent operating lease liabilities<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
Income taxes payable<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
-61.79%<\/p>\n
44.85%<\/p>\n
Total current liabilities<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
34.46%<\/p>\n
94.19%<\/p>\n
Long-term debt<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
0.14%<\/p>\n
683.57%<\/p>\n
Other long term liabilities<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
566.85%<\/p>\n
589.86%<\/p>\n
Total liabilities<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
116.37%<\/p>\n
240.59%<\/p>\n
Paid in capital<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
5.98%<\/p>\n
14.82%<\/p>\n
Treasury Stock<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
16.28%<\/p>\n
28.41%<\/p>\n
Common stock (100,000 shares)<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
-3.10%<\/p>\n
-3.18%<\/p>\n
Retained earnings<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
1.39%<\/p>\n
-4.91%<\/p>\n
Total common equity<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
1.62%<\/p>\n
-0.46%<\/p>\n
Total liabilities and equity<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
0.00%<\/p>\n
53.92%<\/p>\n
109.39%<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Net sales<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
100.000%<\/p>\n
100.000%<\/p>\n
100.000%<\/p>\n
Costs of Goods Sold Except Depr.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
71.587%<\/p>\n
71.926%<\/p>\n
78.510%<\/p>\n
General and administrative<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
14.793%<\/p>\n
14.694%<\/p>\n
19.976%<\/p>\n
Total Operating Cost<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
86.380%<\/p>\n
86.619%<\/p>\n
98.486%<\/p>\n
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)<\/p>\n
13.620%<\/p>\n
13.381%<\/p>\n
1.514%<\/p>\n
Less interest<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
-0.068%<\/p>\n
-0.113%<\/p>\n
0.666%<\/p>\n
Pre-tax earnings<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
13.688%<\/p>\n
13.494%<\/p>\n
0.848%<\/p>\n
Provision for tax on earnings<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
3.093%<\/p>\n
3.138%<\/p>\n
0.167%<\/p>\n
Net Income before preferred dividends<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
10.595%<\/p>\n
10.356%<\/p>\n
0.681%<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Ross Firm Project Team D Derar Yaghi, Karime Gonzalez, Phuong Nguyen FINA 5318 NB Dr. Cheng November 12, 2021 \u00a0 \u00a0 Table of Contents Overview\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026.. 2 Background\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026….2-6 Corporate Governance\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…. 5 Competition\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u20266-7 Effects of the Pandemic\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.8-9 Ratio analysis for ROSS for three years and industry average\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.10-11 Financial Statement\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026….12 Income Statement\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026….12 Balance Sheet\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…… 12 Return on Equity\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.12 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[10],"class_list":["post-88985","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-research-paper-writing","tag-writing"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/88985","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=88985"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/88985\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=88985"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=88985"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=88985"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}