Page<\/p>\n
of 22<\/p>\n
ZOOM<\/p>\n
2-0<\/p>\n
Chapter 2 <\/p>\n
Risk Management Process<\/p>\n
First reckon, then risk<\/p>\n
Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke<\/p>\n
This chapter provides the essence of the five-step risk
management process. It illustrates the application of
each step to military operations through the factors
of METT-T. <\/p>\n
THE FIVE STEPS: AN OVERVIEW<\/p>\n
Risk management is the process of identifying and controlling
hazards to conserve combat power and resources.<\/p>\n
The five steps of
risk management are\u2014
\u2022 Step 1. Identify hazards.
\u2022 Step 2. Assess hazards to determine risks.
\u2022 Step 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions.
\u2022 Step 4. Implement controls.
\u2022 Step 5. Supervise and evaluate.
This five-step process is integrated into the military decision-making
process as shown in Figure 2-1.
FM 100-40 provides insight into the context in which the risk
management process is applied herein. Areas of particular interest in
FM 100-40 include\u2014
\u2022 Solving tactical problems (Chapter 1).
\u2022 The science and art of tactics (Chapter 1).
\u2022 Hasty versus deliberate operations (Chapter 1).
\u2022 The plan-prepare-execute cycle (Chapter 1).
\u2022 Basic tactical control measures (Chapter 2).
\u2022 The factors of METT-T (Chapter 2). <\/p>\n
FM 100-14<\/p>\n
2-1<\/p>\n
Mission Receipt
Mission Analysis
COA Development
COA Analysis
COA Comparison
COA Approval
Orders Production
Rehearsal1
Execution and1 Assessment
Step 1
IdentifyHazards
Step 2
Assess
Hazards
Step 3
Develop
Controls
and
Make Risk
Decision
Step 4
Implement
Controls
Step 5
Supervise and
EvaluateMilitary Decision-
Making Process
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Risk Management Steps
X X X
X X X
1All boxes are marked to emphasize the continued use of the risk management
process throughout the mission<\/p>\n
Risk decisions should be based upon awareness rather than
mechanical habit. Leaders should act on a keen appreciation for the
essential factors that make each situation unique instead of from
conditioned response. Throughout the entire operational continuum,
the commander must consider US Government civilians and contract
support personnel in his risk management process. Hazards can exist,
regardless of enemy or adversary actions, in areas with no direct
enemy contact and in areas outside the enemy\u2019s or adversary\u2019s<\/p>\n
Figure 2-1. Risk Management Steps Correlated with
Military Decision-Making Tasks<\/p>\n
Risk Management<\/p>\n
2-2<\/p>\n
influence. The two types of risk that exist across the wide range of
Army operations are <\/p>\n
tactical risks<\/p>\n
and <\/p>\n
accident risks.<\/p>\n
\u2022 <\/p>\n
Tactical risk<\/p>\n
is risk concerned with hazards that exist because of
the presence of either the enemy or an adversary. It applies to all
levels of war and across the spectrum of operations.
\u2022 <\/p>\n
Accident risk<\/p>\n
includes all operational risk considerations other
than tactical risk. It includes risks to the friendly force. It also
includes risks posed to civilians by an operation, as well as an
operations impact on the environment. It can include activities
associated with hazards concerning friendly personnel,
civilians, equipment readiness, and environmental conditions.<\/p>\n
STEPS 1 AND 2<\/p>\n
Steps 1 and 2 together comprise the risk assessment. In Step 1,
individuals identify the hazards that may be encountered in executing
a mission. In Step 2, they determine the direct impact of each hazard on
the operation. The risk assessment provides for enhanced situational
awareness. This awareness builds confidence and allows soldiers and
units to take timely, efficient, and effective protective measures.<\/p>\n
STEPS 3 THROUGH 5<\/p>\n
Steps 3 through 5 are the essential follow-through actions to
effectively manage risk. In these steps, leaders balance risk against
costs\u2014political, economic, environmental, and to combat power\u2014
and take appropriate actions to eliminate unnecessary risk. During
execution, as well as during planning and preparation, leaders
continuously assess the risk to the overall mission and to those
involved in the task. Finally, leaders and individuals evaluate the
effectiveness of controls and provide lessons learned so that others
may benefit from the experience. <\/p>\n
THE FIVE STEPS APPLIED<\/p>\n
STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS <\/p>\n
A <\/p>\n
hazard<\/p>\n
is an actual or potential condition where the following
can occur due to exposure to the hazard:
\u2022 Injury, illness, or death of personnel.
\u2022 Damage to or loss of equipment and property.
\u2022 Mission degradation.<\/p>\n
FM 100-14<\/p>\n
2-3<\/p>\n
Hazards are sources of danger or risks due to enemy or adversary
presence and other conditions not due to enemy or adversary
capabilities. Hazards are found in all operational environments.
Combat operations, stability operations, base support operations, and
training present unique hazards for units involved in these kinds of
missions. Hazards are identified during the first four steps of the
military decision-making process: <\/p>\n
mission receipt, mission analysis, COA
development<\/p>\n
, and <\/p>\n
COA analysis<\/p>\n
.
The ability of unit leaders and staffs to identify hazards is key. One
reality of today\u2019s missions is that the aspect of a hazard can change
rapidly. Things of little risk initially can quickly become major threats
due to unforeseen natural or man-made events. Leaders should be
aware of this possibility. Complacency to the fact that existing controls
may not continue to control hazards in rapidly changing situations
should be viewed as a hazard in itself.
The factors of METT-T provide a sound framework for identifying
hazards when planning, preparing, and executing operations. When
applying risk management to METT-T during mission analysis,
leaders and staffs should look for hazards that affect both tactical and
accident risks. They must identify all hazards that may present
significant risks to the mission.<\/p>\n
Mission <\/p>\n
Leaders first analyze the assigned mission. They look at the type
of mission to be accomplished and consider possible subsequent
missions. Certain kinds of operations are inherently more dangerous
than others. For example, a deliberate frontal attack, because of the
associated movement, is more likely to expose a unit to losses than
would a defense from prepared positions. Identifying missions that
routinely present great risk is imperative. Leaders also look for
hazards associated with complexity of the plan such as\u2014
\u2022 A scheme of maneuver that is difficult to understand or too
complex for accurate communications down to the lowest level.
\u2022 The impact of operating under a fragmentary order (FRAGO).<\/p>\n
Enemy<\/p>\n
Commanders look for enemy capabilities that pose significant
hazards to the operation. For example, \u201cWhat can the enemy do to<\/p>\n
Risk Management<\/p>\n
2-4<\/p>\n
defeat my operation?\u201d Common shortfalls that can create hazards
during operations against an enemy include failure to\u2014
\u2022 Assess potential advantages to the enemy provided by the
battlefield environment.
\u2022 Fully assess the enemy\u2019s capabilities.
\u2022 Understand enemy collection capabilities and friendly
vulnerabilities to those capabilities.
\u2022 Accurately determine the enemy\u2019s probable COAs.
\u2022 Plan and coordinate active ground and aerial reconnaissance
activities.
\u2022 Disseminate intelligence about the enemy to lower levels.
\u2022 Identifying terrorist threats and capabilities.
Intelligence plays a critical part in identifying hazards associated
with tactical risk. Intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB) is a
dynamic staff process that continually integrates new information and
intelligence that ultimately becomes input to the commander \u2019s risk
assessment process. Intelligence assists in identifying hazards during
operations by\u2014
\u2022 Identifying the opportunities and constraints the battlefield
environment offers to threat and friendly forces.
\u2022 Thoroughly portraying threat capabilities and vulnerabilities.
\u2022 Collecting information on populations, governments, and
infrastructures.
FMs 34-130 and 34-60, respectively, provide detailed information on
IPB and on counterintelligence operations and multidiscipline
counterintelligence analysis.<\/p>\n
Terrain and Weather<\/p>\n
In addition to those due to the enemy or adversaries, the most
obvious hazards to military operations are due to terrain and weather.
Terrain and weather affect the type of hazard encountered. When the
enemy uses terrain to his advantage, the risk is clearly tactical. The
aspects of terrain and weather may create situations where accident
risks predominate. When looking at this from a purely mission
perspective, familiarity of the unit with the terrain and its associated
environment must be paramount. Basic issues include\u2014
\u2022 How long the unit has operated in the environment and climate.
\u2022 Whether the terrain has been crossed before.<\/p>\n
FM 100-14<\/p>\n
2-5<\/p>\n
Terrain. <\/p>\n
The five main military aspects of terrain\u2014<\/p>\n
observation and
fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain and decisive terrain,
and avenues of approach (OCOKA)\u2014<\/p>\n
can be used to identify and assess
hazards impacting on friendly forces. Chapter 2 of FM 100-40 has
details on OCOKA. The terrain analysis includes both map and on-the-
ground reconnaissance to identify how well unit capabilities and
mission demands can be accommodated by the terrain.
\u2022 <\/p>\n
Observation and fields of fire.<\/p>\n
Hazards associated with this usually
involve when the enemy will be able to engage a friendly unit and
when friendly unit weapons capabilities allow it to effectively
engage the enemy.
\u2022 <\/p>\n
Cover and concealment.<\/p>\n
Hazards associated with cover and
concealment are created by the enemy\u2019s ability to place direct or
indirect fire on friendly forces.
\u2022 <\/p>\n
Obstacles. <\/p>\n
Hazards associated with obstacles may be accident or
tactical. They may be due to natural conditions such as rivers or
swamps or man-made such as minefields or built-up areas.
\u2022 <\/p>\n
Key terrain and decisive terrain.<\/p>\n
Hazards are a marked advantage
terrain provides to the enemy if he controls such terrain or
denies its use to friendly forces.
\u2022 <\/p>\n
Avenues of approach.<\/p>\n
Hazards associated with avenues of
approach can affect both tactical and accident risks. Such
hazards include conditions where an avenue of approach
impedes deployment of friendly combat power or where it
supports deployment of enemy combat power.<\/p>\n
Weather. <\/p>\n
Weather works hand-in-hand with terrain to create
hazards. To identify weather hazards, leaders and soldiers must
assess the impact on operating systems. Mistakes include not
considering the\u2014
\u2022 Adverse effects of heat and cold hazards on the performance
of soldiers.
\u2022 Effects of climate and weather on maintenance of vehicles and
equipment before beginning an operation.
\u2022 Hazardous effects of weather on the five military aspects
of terrain.<\/p>\n
Risk Management<\/p>\n
2-6<\/p>\n
Troops<\/p>\n
Leaders analyze the capabilities of available friendly troops.
A s s o c i a t e d h a z a rd s i m p a c t b o t h t h e s o l d i e r a n d u n i t . K e y
considerations are level of training, manning levels, the condition and
maintenance of vehicles and equipment, morale, availability of
supplies and services, and the physical and emotional health of
soldiers. Leaders and soldiers must be vigilant to the fact that hazards
in these areas can adversely affect a mission, even when all tactical
considerations point to success. Mission failure can be caused by\u2014
\u2022 <\/p>\n
Hazards to the physical and emotional health of soldiers.<\/p>\n
Inadequate
sanitation facilities, water purification capabilities, medical
attention, and evacuation capabilities are key hazards that can
arise from incomplete logistical planning. Care of troops requires
long-range projections of all classes of supply, with close
monitoring of mission changes that could impact availability or
depletion of supplies. When beginning an operation immediately
upon arriving in theater, hazards include not implementing
measures to help soldiers overcome fatigue or acclimatize them to
the geographical area and associated climate.
\u2022 <\/p>\n
Hazards to task organization or units participating in an operation.<\/p>\n
Hazards include how long units have worked together under a
particular command relationship. During stability operations,
task organizations may change often. Hazards include poor
communication, unfamiliarity with higher headquarters SOPs,
and insufficient combat power to accomplish the mission.
\u2022 <\/p>\n
Hazards associated with long-term missions.<\/p>\n
Long-term missions
include nation building, peacekeeping, or insurgency\/
counterinsurgency operations. Hazards associated with these
missions include the turmoil of personnel turnover, lack of
continuity of leadership, inexperience, and lack of knowledge of
the situation and the unit\u2019s operating procedures. An especially
insidious hazard is critical-skills atrophy that results from not
performing METL-related missions.<\/p>\n
Time Available<\/p>\n
The hazard is insufficient time to plan, prepare, and execute
operations. Planning time is always at a premium. Leaders routinely
apply the one-third\/two-thirds rule to ensure their subordinate units
are given maximum time to plan. Failure to accomplish a mission on<\/p>\n
FM 100-14<\/p>\n
2-7<\/p>\n
time can result in shortages of time for subordinate and adjacent units
to accomplish their mission.<\/p>\n
Civilians<\/p>\n
The commander \u2019s legal responsibility is to consider hazards to,
and safeguarding of, civilians in his area of operations. <\/p>\n
Civilians<\/p>\n
include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary
organizations (PVOs), US Government civilians, foreign national
civilians, the media, and dislocated civilians put at risk by military
operations. The commander must consider hazards that can occur
across the range of operations, such as\u2014
\u2022 <\/p>\n
In a wartime environment. <\/p>\n
The commander must consider the
hazard of collateral damage which may result in creating
new adversaries.
\u2022 <\/p>\n
In a<\/p>\n
peacetime environment. <\/p>\n
The commander must consider the
political attitudes and previous actions of civilians in identifying
hazards to friendly forces and the populace itself.<\/p>\n
Adversaries<\/p>\n
are hostile elements other than the enemy that may be
encountered during any operation. They present additional hazards.
They may be organized opposition or individuals that challenge
authority. They may include such diverse elements as rioters,
criminals, rogues, or gangs that might want to harass a peace
enforcement mission.<\/p>\n
STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS <\/p>\n
Step 2 completes the risk assessment. Risk is the chance of hazard
or bad consequences. This step examines each hazard in terms of
probability and severity to determine the risk level of one or more
hazardous incidents that can result from exposure to the hazard. This
step is conducted during three steps of the military decision-making
process\u2014<\/p>\n
mission analysis, COA development, <\/p>\n
and<\/p>\n
COA analysis. <\/p>\n
This
step is also conducted after controls are developed.
The incident must be credible in that it must have a reasonable
expectation of happening. The end result is an estimate of risk from
each hazard and an estimate of the overall risk to the mission caused
by hazards that cannot be eliminated. Leaders must also assess the
risk to civilians posed by the operation. They may need to assess the
operations\u2019 impact on the environment. This step is conducted in
three substeps.<\/p>\n
Risk Management<\/p>\n
2-8<\/p>\n
Substep A <\/p>\n
Leaders and staffs assess each hazard in relation to the <\/p>\n
probability<\/p>\n
of a hazardous incident. The probability levels estimated for each
hazard may be based on the mission, COAs being developed and
analyzed, or frequency of a similar event. Figure 2-2 provides a
summary of the five degrees of probability. The letters in parentheses
following each degree (A through E) provide a symbol for depicting
probability. For example, the letter <\/p>\n
A<\/p>\n
represents <\/p>\n
frequent<\/p>\n
probability.<\/p>\n
FREQUENT (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced<\/p>\n
Single item Occurs very often in service life. Expected to occur
several times over duration of a specific mission or
operation. Always occurs.
Fleet or inventory of
items
Occurs continuously during a specific mission or
operation, or over a service life.
Individual soldier Occurs very often in career. Expected to occur several
times during mission or operation. Always occurs.
All soldiers exposed Occurs continuously during a specific mission or
operation.<\/p>\n
LIKELY (B) Occurs several times<\/p>\n
Single item Occurs several times in service life. Expected to occur
during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
items
Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently
(regular intervals, generally often,).
Individual soldier Occurs several times in career. Expected to occur during
a specific mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently.<\/p>\n
OCCASIONAL (C) Occurs sporadically<\/p>\n
Single item Occurs some time in service life. May occur about as
often as not during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
items
Occurs several times in service life.
Individual soldier Occurs some time in career. May occur during a specific
mission or operation, but not often.
All soldiers exposed Occurs sporadically (irregularly, sparsely, or sometimes). <\/p>\n
Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability<\/p>\n
FM 100-14<\/p>\n
2-9
Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability (continued)<\/p>\n
Substep B<\/p>\n
Substep B addresses the <\/p>\n
severity<\/p>\n
of each hazard. It is expressed in
terms of\u2014
\u2022 Degree of injury or illness.
\u2022 Loss of or damage to equipment or property.
\u2022 Environmental damage.
\u2022 Other mission-impairing factors such as lost combat power.
The degree of severity estimated for each hazard may be based on
knowledge of the results of similar past events. Figure 2-3 provides a
summary<\/p>\n
of the four degrees of hazard severity. The<\/p>\n
Roman numerals
in parentheses following each degree (I through IV) provide a
convenient symbol for depicting severity. For example, <\/p>\n
I<\/p>\n
represents
the <\/p>\n
catastrophic<\/p>\n
degree of severity.<\/p>\n
SELDOM (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time<\/p>\n
Single item Occurs in service life, but only remotely possible. Not
expected to occur during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
items
Occurs as isolated incidents. Possible to occur some time
in service life, but rarely. Usually does not occur.
Individual soldier Occurs as isolated incident during a career. Remotely
possible, but not expected to occur during a specific
mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed Occurs rarely within exposed population as isolated
incidents.<\/p>\n
UNLIKELY (E) Can assume will not occur, but not impossible<\/p>\n
Single item Occurrence not impossible, but can assume will almost
never occur in service life. Can assume will not occur
during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
items
Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incidents
may occur over service life.
Individual soldier Occurrence not impossible, but may assume will not occur
in career or during a specific mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed Occurs very rarely, but not impossible.<\/p>\n
Risk Management<\/p>\n
2-10<\/p>\n
CATASTROPHIC (I)<\/p>\n
Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or
mission failure. Death or permanent total
disability (accident risk). Loss of major or
mission-critical system or equipment. Major
p r o p e r t y ( f a c i l i t y ) d a m a g e . S e v e r e
environmental damage. Mission-critical
security failure. Unacceptable collateral
damage.<\/p>\n
CRITICAL (II)<\/p>\n
Significantly (severely) degraded mission
capability or unit readiness. Permanent
partial disability, temporary total disability
exceeding 3 months time (accident risk).
Extensive (major) damage to equipment or
systems. Significant damage to property or
t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . S e c u r i t y f a i l u r e .
Significant collateral damage.<\/p>\n
MARGINAL (III)<\/p>\n
Degraded mission capability or unit
readiness. Minor damage to equipment or
systems, property, or the environment. Lost
day due to injury or illness not exceeding 3
months (accident risk). Minor damage to
property or the environment.<\/p>\n
NEGLIGIBLE (IV)<\/p>\n
Little or no adverse impact on mission
capability. First aid or minor medical
treatment (accident risk). Slight equipment
or system damage, but fully functional and
s e r v i c e a bl e. L i t t l e o r n o p r o p e r t y o r
environmental damage.<\/p>\n
Figure 2-3. Hazard Severity<\/p>\n
Substep C<\/p>\n
In this substep leaders and staffs expand what they understand
about probable hazardous incidents into estimates of levels of risk for
each identified hazard and an estimate of the overall risk for the
operation. Estimating risk follows from examining the outcomes of
Substeps A and B; that is, both the probability and severity of
hazardous incidents. This substep is more art than science. Much
depends on the use of historical lessons learned, intuitive analysis,<\/p>\n
FM 100-14<\/p>\n
2-11<\/p>\n
Risk Assessment Matrix
Probability
Severity Frequent
A
Likely
B
Occasional
C
Seldom
D
Unlikely
E
Catastrophic
Critical
Marginal
Negligible
I
II
III
IV
E
E
H
M
E
H
M
L
H
H
M
L
H
M
L
L
M
L
L
L
E \u2013
H \u2013
M \u2013
L \u2013
Extremely High Risk
High Risk
Moderate Risk
Low Risk<\/p>\n
experience, and judgment. Uncertainty can arise in the assessment of
both the probability and severity of a hazardous incident. Uncertainty
results from unknowns about a situation; from incomplete, inaccurate,
undependable, or contradictory information; and from unforeseen
circumstances. Therefore, assessment of risk requires good judgment.
Figure 2-4 is a standardized matrix that can be used to assist in this
process. Leaders and staffs enter the estimated degree of severity and
probability for each hazard in Substeps A and B from the severity row
and probability column, respectively. The point where the severity
row and probability column intersect defines the level of risk. For
example, if the hazard is estimated to have a <\/p>\n
critical<\/p>\n
severity (II) and a<\/p>\n
likely<\/p>\n
probability (B), the level of risk is high (H).
Figure 2-5 provides a summary of the levels of risk. It also
provides examples of hazardous incidents for each risk level. Several
examples illustrate the trade-off between tactical and accident risks.<\/p>\n
Figure 2-4. Risk Assessment Matrix<\/p>\n
Risk Management<\/p>\n
2-12<\/p>\n
E – E x t r e m e l y H i g h : <\/p>\n
Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if hazardsoccur during mission. A <\/p>\n
frequent<\/p>\n
or likely probability of catastrophic loss(IA or IB) or <\/p>\n
frequent<\/p>\n
probability of <\/p>\n
critical<\/p>\n
loss (IIA) exists.<\/p>\n
E x a m p l e : <\/p>\n
A commander finds that one of his implied tasks to attack anobjective involves crossing a normally shallow riverbed. After looking at
the factors of METT-T, he discovers that three days of intense rain have
raised the water level to rise above flood stage, with currents far in
excess of his ability to safely ford with armored vehicles. After
discussing COAs with his staff, he determines the accident risk is
extremely high because of the likely probability and catastrophic
severity of losing vehicles and killing soldiers. His conclusions are
based on his experience with and knowledge of fording armored
vehicles under the existing conditions of water depth and current
speed. <\/p>\n
H – H i g h : <\/p>\n
Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of therequired mission standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the
mission, or inability to complete the mission to standard if hazards
occur during the mission. <\/p>\n
Occasional<\/p>\n
to <\/p>\n
seldom<\/p>\n
probability ofcatastrophic loss (IC or ID) exists. A <\/p>\n
likely<\/p>\n
to<\/p>\n
occasional<\/p>\n
probabilityexists of a critical loss (IIB or IIC) occurring. <\/p>\n
Frequent<\/p>\n
probability of<\/p>\n
marginal<\/p>\n
losses (IIIA) exists.<\/p>\n
E x a m p l e : <\/p>\n
During a preplanned ambush, the leader discovers that theforce he intends to ambush has significantly more combat power than
his own force can accommodate. He realizes that he could only delay
rather than destroy the enemy. He knows his casualty estimates would
be very high if the enemy reorganized and counterattacked. He also
knows that the size of the enemy force could seriously impact adjacent
units conducting a movement to contact. He determines the situation is<\/p>\n
high risk <\/p>\n
because he estimates (based on his training and experience)t h e r e i s a l i ke l y p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e e n e my r e o r g a n i z i n g a n d
counterattacking and the severity of loss to his unit would be critical.<\/p>\n
M – M o d e r a t e : <\/p>\n
Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of therequired mission standard will have a reduced mission capability if
hazards occur during mission. An <\/p>\n
unlikely<\/p>\n
probability of catastrophicloss (IE) exists. The probability of a <\/p>\n
critical<\/p>\n
loss is <\/p>\n
seldom<\/p>\n
(IID). <\/p>\n
Marginal<\/p>\n
losses occur with a <\/p>\n
likely <\/p>\n
or<\/p>\n
occasional <\/p>\n
probability<\/p>\n
(IIIB or IIIC). A<\/p>\n
frequent<\/p>\n
probability of negligible (IVA) losses exists. <\/p>\n
E x a m p l e : <\/p>\n
A commander in a defensive position receives a warning orderto be prepared to counterattack if the enemy attacks again. He chooses
to use pre-positioned ammunition caches to support his defense, as
opposed to moving his ammunition resupply forward by truck. He
determines that the severity of not having an immediate resupply of
ammunition available during the counterattack will have a <\/p>\n
critical<\/p>\n
impacton his combat power. He realizes that if the enemy forces him to
abandon his forward positions, the severity of the loss of his<\/p>\n
Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk <\/p>\n
FM 100-14<\/p>\n
2-13<\/p>\n
ammunition caches will critically impact his combat power. Heconsiders that his unit is deployed in excellent defensive positions. He
has repelled two attacks that resulted in the destruction of an estimated
50 percent of the enemy\u2019s combat power. He receives information that
the probability of the enemy attacking is <\/p>\n
likely<\/p>\n
, but that the probabilityof the enemy being reinforced and attacking in overwhelming force is
remote <\/p>\n
(seldom)<\/p>\n
. The commander concludes that the risk of conductinga counterattack with limited ammunition is greater than the <\/p>\n
moderate<\/p>\n
risk of the enemy pushing him back.<\/p>\n
L – L o w :<\/p>\n
Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing themission. The probability of <\/p>\n
critical<\/p>\n
loss is <\/p>\n
unlikely<\/p>\n
(IIE), while that of<\/p>\n
marginal<\/p>\n
loss is <\/p>\n
seldom<\/p>\n
(IIID) or <\/p>\n
unlikely<\/p>\n
(IIIE). The probability of a<\/p>\n
negligible<\/p>\n
loss is likely or less (IVB through (IVE).
E x a m p l e : A mechanized task force (TF) conducting a movement tocontact in a desert environment is overtaken by nightfall before
reaching its limit of advance (LOA). The terrain along the axis of
advance is flat and open. Visibility is about 800 meters under a clear sky
illuminated by a full moon. Estimates put the enemy, which has been
hastily withdrawing for the past three days, at approximately 30 percent
strength. Contact has been light with no defensible terrain along the
TF\u2019s axis. The TF commander considers all the factors. In addition, the
TF is 100 percent operational in using night vision devices. The TF
commander estimates that it is unlikely that his unit will incur losses ofcritical severity by being surprised by the enemy or lose critical combatpower due to an accident. He estimates the risk to his force in
continuing a nighttime movement is low.
Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk (continued)
STEP 3. DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS
Risk management is the recognition that decision making
occurs under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions must remain
consistent with the commander\u2019s stated intent and offer a good
e x p e c t a t i o n o f s u c c e s s . T h e r i s k – t a k i n g s k i l l re q u i re s
competency as a prerequisite.
FM 100-7, Decisive Force:
The Army in Theater Operations, May 1995
Step 3 is accomplished in two substeps: develop controls and
make risk decisions. This is done during the COA development, COA
analysis, COA comparison, and COA approval of the military
decision-making process.
Substep A – Develop Controls
After assessing each hazard, leaders develop one or more controls
that either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and\/or<\/p>\n
Risk Management
2-14
severity) of a hazardous incident. When developing controls, they
consider the reason for the hazard not just the hazard itself.
Types of Controls. Controls can take many forms, but fall
into three basic categories\u2014educational controls, physical controls,
and avoidance.
\u2022 Educational controls. These controls are based on the knowledge
and skills of the units and individuals. Effective control is
implemented through individual and collective training that
ensures performance to standard.
\u2022 Physical controls. These controls may take the form of barriers
and guards or signs to warn individuals and units that a hazard
exists. Additionally, special controller or oversight personnel
responsible for locating specific hazards fall into this category.
\u2022 Avoidance. These controls are applied when leaders take positive
action to prevent contact with an identified hazard.
Criteria for Controls. To be effective, each control developed
must meet the following criteria:
\u2022 Suitability. It must remove the hazard or mitigate (reduce) the
residual risk to an acceptable level.
\u2022 Feasibility. The unit must have the capability to implement
the control.
\u2022 Acceptability. The benefit gained by implementing the control
must justify the cost in resources and time. The assessment of
acceptability is largely subjective. Figure 2-6 gives criteria for
determining acceptability of controls for each identified hazard.
Support Availability of adequate personnel, equipment,
supplies, and facilities necessary to implement a
suitable controls.
Standards Guidance and procedures for implementing a control
are clear, practical, and specific.
Training Knowledge and skills are adequate to implement a
control.
Leadership Leaders are competent to implement a control.
Individual Individual soldiers are sufficiently self-disciplined to
implement a control.
Figure 2-6. Criteria for Determining Acceptability of Controls<\/p>\n
FM 100-14
2-15
Examples of Controls. Examples of controls include\u2014
\u2022 Engineering or designing to eliminate or control hazards.
\u2022 Selecting a COA that avoids identified hazards.
\u2022 Limiting the number of people and the amount of time they are
exposed to hazards, consistent with mission requirements.
\u2022 Selecting personnel with appropriate mental, emotional, and
physical capabilities.
\u2022 Providing protective clothing, equipment, and safety and
security devices.
\u2022 Providing such services as adequate sanitation facilities and
water purification capabilities.
\u2022 Providing warning signs and signals.
\u2022 Scheduling vehicle and aircraft silhouette drills.
\u2022 Planning training, including rehearsals, rock drills, battle drills,
and so forth.
\u2022 Programming communications links for key civilian organizations.
\u2022 Establishing battlefield controls such as areas of operations and
b o u n d a r i e s , d i re c t fi re c o n t ro l m e a s u re s , fi re s u p p o r t
coordination measures, rules of engagement, airspace control
measures, bridge classification, traffic control, and so forth.
\u2022 Developing terrorist attack warning systems and response plans.
The key is to specify who, what, where, when, and how each
control is to be used. For example\u2014
\u2022 Planning and scheduling intensive threat and friendly vehicle
identification refresher training for all antiarmor and air defense
weapons crews before the mission reduces the probability of
engaging a friendly vehicle or aircraft (fratricide).
\u2022 Programming installation of crashworthy passenger seats in the
UH-60 Blackhawk, when mission circumstances do not indicate
their removal, can reduce the severity of injuries in crashes.
\u2022 Requiring soldiers to wear flak vests and helmets during
movement to contact, or when riding in vehicles in areas where
enemy fire is likely, can reduce the probability and severity of a
wound from small arms fire or fragments.<\/p>\n
Risk Management
2-16
\u2022 Establishing strong continuity documents and planning overlap
tours for key leaders facilitate smooth transitions during
extended operations.
Residual Risk. Once the responsible leader develops and
accepts controls, he determines the residual risk associated with each
hazard and the overall residual risk for the mission.
\u2022 Residual risk is the risk remaining after controls have been
selected for the hazard. Residual risk is valid (true) only if the
controls for it are implemented. As controls for hazards are
identified and selected, the hazards are reassessed as in Step 2
and the level of risk is then revised. This process is repeated until
the level of residual risk is acceptable to the commander or leader
or cannot be further reduced. See Figures A-3 through A-5.
\u2022 Overall residual risk of a mission must be determined when more
than one hazard is identified. The residual risk for each of these
hazards may have a different level, depending on the assessed
probability and severity of the hazardous incident. Overall
residual mission risk should be determined based on the incident
having the greatest residual risk. Determining overall mission risk
by averaging the risks of all hazards is not valid. If one hazard has
high risk, the overall residual risk of the mission is high, no matter
how many moderate or low risk hazards are present.
Substep B – Make Risk Decision
A key element of the risk decision is determining if the risk is
justified. The commander must compare and balance the risk against
mission expectations. He alone decides if controls are sufficient and
acceptable and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If he
determines the risk level is too high, he directs the development of
additional controls or alternate controls, or he modifies, changes, or
rejects the COA.
Leaders can use the risk assessment matrix in Figure 2-4\u2014in
conjunction with their commanders\u2019 guidance\u2014to communicate how
much risk they are willing to delegate. For example, a commander may
place constraints on his subordinates that restrict their freedom of action
to accept risk in instances where the risk might imperil his intent, his
higher commander\u2019s intent, or a critical capability of the unit. <\/p>\n
FM 100-14
2-17
STEP 4. IMPLEMENT CONTROLS
Leaders and staffs ensure that controls are integrated into SOPs,
written and verbal orders, mission briefings, and staff estimates. The
critical check for this step, with oversight, is to ensure that controls
are converted into clear, simple execution orders understood at all
l e v e l s . I m p l e m e n t i n g c o n t r o l s i n c l u d e s c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d
communication with\u2014
\u2022 Appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and those
executing the mission.
\u2022 Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) organizations
and civilian agencies that are part of the force.
The media, NGOs, and PVOs must be included in coordination when
their presence impacts or is impacted by the force.
Leaders must explain how supervisors will implement controls.
Examples of control implementation include\u2014
\u2022 Conducting vehicle and aircraft silhouette drills.
\u2022 Conducting rehearsals, rock drills, battle drills, and so forth.
\u2022 Conducting intensive threat and friendly vehicle
identification refresher training for all antiarmor and air
defense weapons crews.
\u2022 Conducting orientation for replacement personnel.
\u2022 Installing and maintaining communications links for key
civilian organizations.
\u2022 Operating in convoys of four vehicles minimum.
\u2022 Carrying weapons and wearing flak jackets and helmets when
outside secure compounds.
STEP 5. SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE
Leaders must supervise the execution of their orders. The more
untrained the troops, the more detailed this supervision must be.
Infantry in Battle, 1939
During mission preparation and execution, leaders must ensure
that their subordinates understand how to execute risk controls.
Leaders continuously assess risks during the conduct of operations,<\/p>\n
Risk Management
2-18
especially during long-term missions. Leaders maintain situational
awareness. They guard against complacency to ensure that risk
control standards are not relaxed or violated. To gain insight into areas
needing improvement, leaders must continuously evaluate their
units\u2019 effectiveness in managing mission risks.
Supervise
Leaders supervise mission rehearsal and execution to ensure
standards and controls are enforced. Techniques may include spot-
checks, inspections, situation reports and brief-backs, buddy checks,
and close supervision. During the mission, leaders continuously
monitor controls to ensure they remain effective. They modify them as
necessary. Leaders and individuals anticipate, identify, and assess new
hazards to implement controls. They continually assess variable
hazards such as fatigue, equipment serviceability, and the environment.
Leaders modify controls to keep risks at an acceptable level.
During sustained operations, leaders continue planning to ensure
that controls emplaced at the beginning of the mission apply to
changes in the operation\u2019s current situation and to hazardous
conditions. Leaders must maintain an extraordinary degree of
discipline. They must avoid complacency, which can result from
boredom and overconfidence. Leaders must ensure that soldiers do
not relax their vigilance due to performing repetitive tasks\u2014despite
changing roles and missions, unit turbulence and turnover, and
declining skills. Leaders maintain a close overwatch on controls put in
place to reduce risks over a prolonged period. For example, during
stability operations, land mine hazards may not be solved in the near
term, but may require continual attention. Other examples of long-
term hazards that may be encountered include\u2014
\u2022 Climatic extremes.
\u2022 NBC and hazardous waste contamination.
\u2022 Diseases native to a particular area of operation or indigenous
population.
\u2022 Terrorist threats.
Evaluate
After a mission, leaders and individuals evaluate how well the
risk management process was executed. They\u2014
\u2022 Determine how to ensure that successes are continued to the
next mission. <\/p>\n
FM 100-14
2-19
\u2022 Capture and disseminate lessons learned so that others may
benefit from the experience.
\u2022 Consider the effectiveness of the risk assessment in identifying
and accurately assessing the probability and severity of hazards
that resulted in mission degradation.
\u2022 Determine whether the level of residual risk of each hazard and
of the overall mission were accurately estimated.
\u2022 Evaluate the effectiveness of each control in reducing or
removing risk, including whether controls were effectively
communicated, implemented and enforced.
Leaders and individuals determine why some controls were
ineffective and what should be done when the hazard is encountered
again. A control may be altered; the way it is implemented or
supervised may be changed to make it effective; or a completely
different control may be more effective. Leaders must energize the
system to fix systemic problems that hinder combat effectiveness.
Figure 2-7 shows that the risk management process continues
throughout a mission as well as from mission to mission. It is
integral to the military decision-making process. Its application
requires good judgment and intuitive analysis borne of confidence,
experience, and situational awareness.
TOOLS AND PITFALLS
The appendix provides examples of risk management tools to
help leaders assess identified hazards, develop controls, and make
risk decisions. The tools should be tailored to suit particular situations
and missions. The examples in Figures A-3 through A-5 are tools to
manage risk at the tactical level. The example in Figure A-6 is a tool to
manage risk at the operational level. Units may develop additional
tools suitable for their needs.
Units train to a standard. They operate and train regardless of the
degree of real or perceived difficulty. Risk reduction begins with
commanders identifying their METLs. Commanders use the risk
management process to assess the degree of risk related to each METL
their unit must perform. From this assessment, risk reducing standard
operating procedures evolve.
F i g u r e A – 7 p r o v i d e s a n e x a m p l e o f r i s k m a n a g e m e n t
considerations integrated into a mission training plan (MTP) task.<\/p>\n
Risk Management
2-20
Step 1. Identify Hazards
Step 2. Assess Hazards
Determine risk level for each hazard and overall
mission risk
Estimateprobability
Estimateseverity
1As controls for hazards are identified and selected the hazards are
reassessed as in Step 2
Step 4. Implement Controls
Step 5. Supervise and Evaluate
Supervise Evaluate
MISSIONS
New Controls
New Hazards
LessonsLearned
Apply METT-T
Makedecision
Step 3. Develop Controls and
Make Risk Decision
Determine residual risk
level for each hazard
and overall residual
mission risk1
Developcontrols
Figure 2-7. Continuous Application of Risk Management <\/p>\n
FM 100-14
2-21
Pitfalls arise when risk management tools are used without
adaptation to the factors of METT-T. Using a standardized risk
assessment card or checklist may be of some value initially in the
mission analysis and COA development or in cases where a routine
task is performed in an unchanging environment or static situation.
However, such a tool used alone will not likely identify all hazards for
every mission in a changing operational environment.
Completing the risk assessment alone, but failing to identify
effective controls, usually results in a GO or NO-GO decision based on
the initial risk. If the risk assessment does not accurately identify the
hazards and determine the level of residual risk, the leader is likely to
make his risk decision based upon incomplete or inaccurate
information. If the risk assessment places missions in a routine, low-
risk category, the commander may not be informed of a risk decision
resulting in an accepted risk level that could imperil his or his higher
commander \u2019s intent or other affected organizations. The risk
management process is intended to provide reasonable controls to
support mission accomplishment without exposing the force to
unnecessary residual risk.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Page of 22 ZOOM 2-0 Chapter 2 Risk Management Process First reckon, then risk Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke This chapter provides the essence of the five-step risk management process. It illustrates the application of each step to military operations through the factors of METT-T. THE FIVE STEPS: AN OVERVIEW Risk management is the process […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[10],"class_list":["post-92518","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-research-paper-writing","tag-writing"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/92518","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=92518"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/92518\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=92518"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=92518"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=92518"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}