Discussion week 5 Part 1<\/p>\n
Complete the following:<\/p>\n
Watch Inside The Collapse (Part One).<\/p>\n
Watch Inside The Collapse (Part Two).<\/p>\n
After watching the videos, discuss how this financial crash impacted you, your family, a career from which you may have been laid off, or someone you know who was affected.<\/p>\n
*Please make sure to post at least two DQ responses that are 150-words each. “2 by 150” <\/p>\n
TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO FILE Inside The Collapse (Part One): <\/p>\n
00:00:00__________________________________________________________________ <\/p>\n
00:00:00BEGIN TRANSCRIPT: <\/p>\n
00:00:00INSIDE THE COLLAPSE <\/p>\n
00:00:00Produced By <\/p>\n
00:00:00L. Franklin Devine <\/p>\n
00:00:00Jennifer MacDonald <\/p>\n
00:00:00STEVE KROFT If you had to pick someone to write the autopsy report on the Wall Street financial collapse 18 months ago, you couldn’t do any better than Michael Lewis. He is one of the country’s preeminent non-fiction writers, with a knack for turning complicated, mind numbing material into fascinating yarns. He wrote his first bestseller, “Liar’s Poker,” about his experiences as a young Wall Street bond trader, when he was still in his 20s, and he has since followed up with seven more bestsellers on subjects ranging from the Silicon Valley in “The New New Thing” to big time sports in “Money Ball” and “The Blind Side.” His new book, called “The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine,” comes out later this week. And it explains how some of Wall Street’s finest minds managed to destroy $1.75 trillion of wealth in the subprime mortgage markets. We spent two days debriefing him at his home in California. <\/p>\n
00:01:00MICHAEL LEWIS This was an episode where capitalism was almost destroyed, just by the capitalists. And, in the most sensational way, they\u2026 they were sort of destroyed by their own folly. <\/p>\n
00:01:15STEVE KROFT What happened? <\/p>\n
00:01:15MICHAEL LEWIS The incentives for people on Wall Street got so screwed up, that the people who worked there became blinded to their own long term interests. And, because the\u2026 their short term interests were so overpowering. And so they behaved in ways that were antithetical to their own long term interests. <\/p>\n
00:01:35STEVE KROFT Michael Lewis, a one-time wonder boy on Wall Street, is about to turn 50 now, ensconced in this hillside compound in Berkeley, California which has a main house and three cottages. And he is much happier writing about business than actually conducting it. What was the book that bought this place? <\/p>\n
00:01:55MICHAEL LEWIS This would’ve been “The New, New Thing,” that bought this place. <\/p>\n
00:01:55STEVE KROFT How many books have you sold now? <\/p>\n
00:02:00MICHAEL LEWIS Umm\u2026 Some millions. I don’t know how many millions. Not\u2026 Not John Grisham millions, but millions. <\/p>\n
00:02:10STEVE KROFT He lives here with his wife, former MTV News correspondent Tabitha Soren, and their three children, a three-year-old son and two young daughters, who he takes to all of Cal Berkley women’s basketball games. It’s one of the few breaks that Lewis allowed himself over the past 18-months as he dug into the idiocy and negligence that produced the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. <\/p>\n
00:02:30MICHAEL LEWIS I’m afraid that our culture will come to the conclusion, ’cause it’s always the easy conclusion, that everybody was just a bunch of criminals. I think the story is much more interesting than that. I think it’s a story of mass delusion. <\/p>\n
00:02:45STEVE KROFT Lewis’ forte has always been discovering little-known facts and characters that change people’s perception about a story. So when he finally sat down at his computer with sacks full of research to write about this calamity, he had no interest in Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, or Ben Bernanke, or the CEOs of Wall Street’s big investment banks, who he believes had no clue what was going on while it was going on. He wanted to tell the story through the eyes of people who were paying attention, and who knew that a financial disaster was inevitable. <\/p>\n
00:03:20MICHAEL LEWIS There are a handful of characters who actually had seen it coming and made a fortune off of it. And that, and there were so few of them, and there were so many people who\u2026 who had been on the other side that\u2026 I thought that I kind of wondered who they were and why they got themselves into that position. <\/p>\n
00:03:35STEVE KROFT What they saw? <\/p>\n
00:03:35MICHAEL LEWIS What they saw? Almost more, how they saw. <\/p>\n
00:03:40STEVE KROFT How many people were there do you think, in the world that understood what was going on? <\/p>\n
00:03:45MICHAEL LEWIS Between 10 and 20 investors at most, and this is from the universe of tens of thousands of people who could have conceivably made that bet. <\/p>\n
00:03:50STEVE KROFT The first one to see that something was seriously amiss in the burgeoning subprime mortgage market was Dr. Michael Burry, a California physician with only one good eye. He lost the other one to cancer as a child, and also suffers from Asperger’s Syndrome, a condition related to autism that often produces an aversion to social contact. Uncomfortable dealing with patients, Burry quit medicine and started a hedge fund in Cupertino, spending most of his time in a darkened office glued to his computer screen. Beginning in 2003, he turned to something that no one else in America was doing, reading and analyzing the pools of risky subprime mortgage loans that Wall Street had been buying up and bundling into highly profitable mortgage backed securities, which they were selling to investors around the world. <\/p>\n
00:04:40MICHAEL BURRY I called up the prospectuses, and I read the prospectuses, and I looked at these pools. I could see the credit standards within these pools deteriorating just quarter to quarter. First\u2026 <\/p>\n
00:04:50STEVE KROFT How could you tell that? <\/p>\n
00:04:55MICHAEL BURRY There was essentially crappier mortgages being put into these pools, and it didn’t seem investors seemed to care, and it didn’t seem the ratings agencies seemed to care. <\/p>\n
00:05:05STEVE KROFT Do you think many people read these\u2026 read these prospectuses? <\/p>\n
00:05:05MICHAEL BURRY I think the lawyers that put them together, to an extent, maybe. <\/p>\n
00:05:10STEVE KROFT Do you think the executives at the big Wall Street firms who were issuing these bonds had read them or understood them? <\/p>\n
00:05:20MICHAEL BURRY I don’t think they read them, no. And I think that there were probably junior analysts that were given the task of reviewing these issues\u2026 these documents. However, I think that this was a profit center. It was a profit center. It was something the organization wanted to do. <\/p>\n
00:05:40STEVE KROFT In effect, Lewis writes, Michael Burry was doing the first real analysis of the creditworthiness of the subprime borrowers and the structure of the complicated Wall Street mortgage securities, the kind of work that was supposed to have been done by bond rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, so that investors could accurately judge their risks. What you were doing sounds to me like the job that the rating agency should have been doing. <\/p>\n
00:06:05MICHAEL BURRY And there’s no way the rating agencies had anywhere near the manpower to look through all that was being issued. <\/p>\n
00:06:10STEVE KROFT Yeah, but, you’re one guy. And you found it. <\/p>\n
00:06:20MICHAEL BURRY You\u2026 You would think that even if they just looked at a sample maybe they would have come to a realization, but\u2026 <\/p>\n
00:06:25STEVE KROFT By 2005, Michael Burry had come to the realization that the Wall Street bond market had lost its mind. It was buying up hundreds of millions of dollars in dicey loans to unqualified buyers who were, in Michael Lewis’ words, “one broken refrigerator away from default.” Burry concluded that the subprime market would collapse in 2007. <\/p>\n
00:06:45MICHAEL LEWIS He notices for the first time that there are pools, there are\u2026 there are mortgage bonds supported by pools of loans, and most of the loans are what you, are called negative amortizing interest only loans. Which means that, you, the homeowner and buyer, you borrow the money, and you not only don’t have to repay your principal, you have to, you don’t even have to repay the interest. And, if you just don’t pay anything, they just, they just add to your loan. <\/p>\n
00:07:10STEVE KROFT So you can’t lose your house? <\/p>\n
00:07:10MICHAEL LEWIS You can’t lose your house, right, in theory, right? And\u2026 And so he figures we’ve reached the end of the road in the insanity of lending. They\u2026 They’re scraping the bottom of the barrel. Now is the time to lay a bet. And it’s before anybody does. <\/p>\n
00:07:25STEVE KROFT Burry figured out that these mortgage-backed securities would become worthless if just a small percentage of the dicey loans went bad, and he wanted to bet against the worst of them. He decided that the best way to do it would be to get Wall Street to sell in inexpensive insurance contracts on the securities that would pay off big time if they failed. The contracts were called “credit default swaps.” <\/p>\n
00:07:50MICHAEL LEWIS He conceives that they are going to invest(ph) on Wall Street credit default swaps on subprime mortgages, essentially, insurance contracts on the bonds, before they even do. And he helps, participates in the creation of this instrument. And Michael Burry is the first one in. <\/p>\n
00:08:05STEVE KROFT Burry assumed a lot of people would figure out what he was up to, but very few did. It took two years for the drama to play out, but the subprime mortgage market finally collapsed in 2007, just as he had predicted. So you made a ton of money. <\/p>\n
00:08:20MICHAEL BURRY Made a ton of money, much more than I ever imagined, you know I’d ever have. We made $725 million I think, on the funds in 2007. <\/p>\n
00:08:30MICHAEL LEWIS Michael Burry’s advantage was he wasn’t part of the collective. He was\u2026 That he was just this guy in a T-shirt and shorts, with a glass eyeball and Asperger’s Syndrome, looking at the numbers, and when nobody else really was. <\/p>\n
00:08:45STEVE KROFT How can they not look at the numbers? I mean, how can Wall Street be selling all of these\u2026 buying all of these mortgages and repackaging them, and, and not realizing that they’re not very good mortgages? <\/p>\n
00:09:00MICHAEL LEWIS Wall Street is able to delude itself because it’s paid to delude itself. That’s the one of the lessons of this story, is that people see what they’re incentivized to see. If you pay someone not to see the truth, they will not see the truth. And, Wall Street organized itself so people were paid to see something other than the truth. And, that’s one of the central messages of the story. You have to be very careful with how you incentivize people, ’cause they will respond to the incentives. <\/p>\n
00:09:25NEW TUESDAY 10\/9 <\/p>\n
00:09:25The Good Wife <\/p>\n
00:09:30STEVE KROFT And, all of the incentives in Wall Street’s largely unregulated bond market were geared toward keeping the subprime money machine humming. Shortly after Michael Burry decided the people there had lost their minds, Wall Street’s most influential investment bank convinced the financial products division of insurance giant AIG to join the party, a decision that would destroy the company. <\/p>\n
00:09:55MICHAEL LEWIS They insured tens of billions of dollars of subprime mortgage loans without even knowing they were doing it. Goldman Sachs persuaded them to insure these piles of loans without them ever investigating what was in the pile. So there’s an additional level of incompetence. They didn’t even know the mistake they were making. <\/p>\n
00:10:10STEVE KROFT Over a period of just a few months in 2005, Goldman Sachs got AIG to insure $20 billion worth of subprime mortgage securities that the ratings agencies had graded AAA. But in fact, Lewis says, the pools contained some of the worst “drek” on the market. Do you think the big banks like Goldman Sachs played AIG for a patsy? <\/p>\n
00:10:35MICHAEL LEWIS That’s exactly what they did. I mean, I don’t, I think even Goldman Sachs would admit that to themselves, which is saying something. Yes, absolutely. Using the cover of, “We’re all big boys in this market,” umm\u2026 they\u2026 the big investment banks, have long sought to exploit their customers. <\/p>\n
00:10:55STEVE KROFT What role did the rating agencies play in this? <\/p>\n
00:11:00MICHAEL LEWIS They were handmaidens to Wall Street. The ratings agencies get paid by Wall Street, by Merrill Lynch, by Citigroup, by Morgan Stanley, by Goldman Sachs, to rate the bonds that Wall Street creates. This creates a certain moral hazard. <\/p>\n
00:11:15STEVE KROFT You write in the book that Goldman essentially took the worst stuff that they couldn’t sell. They repackaged it and took it to Moody’s. And got Moody’s to rate it AAA? <\/p>\n
00:11:20MICHAEL LEWIS Correct. <\/p>\n
00:11:25STEVE KROFT How? How did\u2026 Did they know that Moody’s was going to rate it AAA? <\/p>\n
00:11:25MICHAEL LEWIS Yes. They had helped design the models, I’m sure, that Moody’s used to rate the bonds. And I’ve spoken with people at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs who said, “We helped the ratings agencies understand these things.” <\/p>\n
00:11:40STEVE KROFT They were the educators. <\/p>\n
00:11:40MICHAEL LEWIS Yeah, they were the educators. <\/p>\n
00:11:45STEVE KROFT Lewis calls the Goldman Sachs-AIG deal one of the original sins of the looming financial crisis. Other Wall Street firms were so jealous of the Goldman deal, they got AIG to insure another $30 billion of what turned out to be worthless securities. But Lewis thinks the fiasco had more to do with Wall Street stupidity than corruption. They didn’t understand these things? <\/p>\n
00:12:05MICHAEL LEWIS Not well enough. They\u2026 They\u2026 uh\u2026 I mean, there’s a wonderful little vignette in the “Big Short” about the leading bond trade, subprime mortgage bond trader at Morgan Stanley, a fellow named Howie Hubler, who manages to lose somewhere between, it’s hard to know, but $7 billion and $12 billion in a matter of\u2026 of six or eight months, more than any single trader has ever lost in the history of Wall Street, and no one knows his name. <\/p>\n
00:12:30STEVE KROFT According to Lewis, at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007, when the commercial bank J.P. Morgan became the first to recognize the danger and fled the subprime market, Hubler was gobbling up $16 billion worth of subprime mortgage bonds that would be worthless in nine months. <\/p>\n
00:12:50MICHAEL LEWIS He did not understand the forces that worked in his own market. And he (inaudible ) to be the smart guy. I mean, what\u2026 what were the dumb guys doing? So I think that it’s really clear that, that the firms themselves did not understand the machine they created. <\/p>\n
00:13:05STEVE KROFT What happened now to Hubler? <\/p>\n
00:13:10MICHAEL LEWIS He’s allowed to resign from Morgan Stanley, and he takes with him millions of dollars in back pay, tens of millions of dollars in back pay, that it was all hushed up, basically. <\/p>\n
00:13:20STEVE KROFT Did most of the people who made these terrible decisions leave with a lot of money? <\/p>\n
00:13:25MICHAEL LEWIS Yes, they all did. I\u2026 I did not, I haven’t run across a single character who didn’t get rich. Anybody above a certain level in all these firms made huge sums of money, by any standard. And the people who were, I mean, this is where it gets a little creepy, the people who were most instrumental in building the subprime mortgage machine, also happened to be the ones who had the most detailed understanding now of the securities in the rubble. And, they’re being paid all over again to sort through the mess because they’re the experts. That is an age-old trick on Wall Street, ’cause generally speaking, people who create disasters make a lot of money cleaning up the disaster, because they’re the ones who know about the disaster. <\/p>\n
00:14:10STEVE KROFT What about the CEOs? <\/p>\n
00:14:15MICHAEL LEWIS Stan O’Neal at Merrill Lynch, and Chuck Prince at Citigroup are the most obvious examples. But\u2026 But they were paid not tens, but into the hundreds of millions of dollars to run their firms into the ground. <\/p>\n
00:14:30STEVE KROFT By the fall of 2008, with AIG and all of the big investment banks at some risk of going under, the government stepped in to bail out the very firms that had caused the crisis. A decision was made that AIG was too big to let fail, and that its gambling debts would be paid off 100 cents on the dollar. And the company that benefited the most was Goldman Sachs. Do you believe it had anything to do with their political connections? <\/p>\n
00:14:55MICHAEL LEWIS Uh\u2026 It’s hard to know. There’s no proof. But it certainly didn’t hurt. It certainly didn’t hurt that the secretary of the Treasury was a former Goldman CEO. It certainly didn’t hurt that a lot of the people at the table were former Goldman employees. It certainly didn’t hurt that the air they, everybody breathed contained the assumption that we can never do anything to harm Goldman Sachs. So sure, I mean, I can’t really see how their political influence umm\u2026 uh\u2026 didn’t have anything to do with it. <\/p>\n
00:15:30STEVE KROFT When we come back, a look at Wall Street’s bonus culture, and why Michael Lewis thinks it’s become unsustainable. <\/p>\n
00:15:4060 MINUTES <\/p>\n
00:15:45END TRANSCRIPT<\/p>\n
TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO FILE Inside The Collapse (Part Two): <\/p>\n
00:00:00______________________________________________________________________________ <\/p>\n
00:00:00BEGIN TRANSCRIPT: <\/p>\n
00:00:00Inside The Collapse <\/p>\n
00:00:00STEVE KROFT Wall Street’s bad bets nearly brought down the financial system in 2008. One thing that didn’t end, Michael Lewis says, was the bonus culture and sense of entitlement in the financial industry. According to the New York State controller, Wall Street employees split twenty billion dollars in bonuses for 2009. That’s up seventeen percent over last year, but it’s not a record. In fact, it’s a third less than the thirty-three billion dollars Wall Street divided up in 2007. The same year everyone on Wall Street began to acknowledge the subprime mortgage losses that would reach 1.75 trillion dollars. The size of the bonuses has left Michael Lewis appalled, but not really surprised. <\/p>\n
00:00:45MICHAEL LEWIS Salomon Brothers– <\/p>\n
00:00:45STEVE KROFT More than twenty years ago, Lewis collected a couple of bonuses himself as a young trader at Salomon Brothers, and he still can’t figure out what he did to deserve them. <\/p>\n
00:00:55MICHAEL LEWIS I got my Wall Street bonus in– I got two bonuses in 1986 and 1987. And it was like winning the lottery. It was– the money was so shocking, even though it seems in retrospect so quaint. It was a couple of hundred thousand dollars when I was twenty-four, twenty-five years old. It was incredible that someone was going to give me a couple hundred thousand dollars for what I’d just done. Because I couldn’t figure out what was so terribly useful about what I’d just done. <\/p>\n
00:01:20STEVE KROFT And Lewis feels the same way about the latest round of bonuses that were paid out on fifty-five billion dollars of Wall Street profits that he thinks wouldn’t have been made without help from Uncle Sam. Once the government decided the banks were too important to fail, Lewis says the only way to get them back on their feet was to give them money. <\/p>\n
00:01:40MICHAEL LEWIS I think they assumed that in response for this gift of life, that they were giving these Wall Street firms, the people who ran the Wall Street firms would behave responsibly in a way that didn’t attract– <\/p>\n
00:01:50STEVE KROFT Meaning what? <\/p>\n
00:01:50MICHAEL LEWIS Meaning not pay themselves huge sums of money. Perhaps not even pay themselves anything. Just say, thank you. And re-jigger their compensation systems. Instead, they did not. Instead, they used the market as an excuse for paying themselves. If we don’t pay our employees of Goldman Sachs huge sums of money, they’re going to leave and go to JPMorgan. And the JPMorgan people say, well, we don’t pay these special people huge sums of money, they can leave and go to Goldman Sachs. And– you– you kind of want to back away from it and say, well, wait a minute. Why are they so valuable in the first place? And really what’s going on is the people at the top of firm want to make a lot of money. And if they’re going to a make a lot of money, they’re going a pay the people under them a lot of money. So, it’s a very elegant form of theft right now. <\/p>\n
00:02:35STEVE KROFT Well, their argument has been, look, we’re entitled to these bonuses this year because we made all of this money. <\/p>\n
00:02:40MICHAEL LEWIS Yeah, no one ever asked them. They never explained how they made all this money. If you look at their businesses right now they’re heavily government dependent, that if you are a Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, or JPMorgan, you have access to a zero-percent loan in, virtually, unlimited quantities from the Federal Reserve. You can take that money and reinvest it in Treasury bonds or in– in– in government agency securities, and you will get the spread. And you could– you could do it over and over. You’re essentially borrowing from the government, lending the government, and taking out– taking a cut, and — <\/p>\n
00:03:15STEVE KROFT So the government’s let them make the money? <\/p>\n
00:03:15MICHAEL LEWIS Well, the government is still subsidizing these firms because the losses were sensational. I mean, in the financial system they are now 1.75 trillion dollars of losses from the subprime mortgage bonanza. And that’s– they’re firms that really, they– look, they really shouldn’t exist. If the market had been allowed to function they would not exist. They’d be failed enterprises. I mean, even now if the government said we have nothing to do with these places anymore, we can let them fail if they fail, they no longer have this effective government guarantee. And, by the way, we’re going to cut out these subsidies that we’re– that we’re handing them under the table, most of them would fail. <\/p>\n
00:03:55STEVE KROFT But none of that has changed the Wall Street bonus culture. Lewis says there is a sense of entitlement to outrageous compensation that he thinks is way out of proportion to its contribution to the U.S. economy. <\/p>\n
00:04:05STEVE KROFT How did that happen? Does somebody thinks they’re worth automatically millions of dollars a year. <\/p>\n
00:04:15MICHAEL LEWIS Well, when you’re surrounded by a lot of other people who are being paid millions of dollars a year, you– you’re not thinking, oh, it’s outrageous for someone to pay me millions of dollars a year. You’re thinking it’s outrageous that Jim got five hundred thousand dollars more than me. That– that– they’re– they’re looking to each other as reference points rather than to the larger society. <\/p>\n
00:04:35STEVE KROFT Are they worth that kind of money? <\/p>\n
00:04:35MICHAEL LEWIS What do you mean? Are they worth that kind of money? <\/p>\n
00:04:40STEVE KROFT Do they deserve all that money? <\/p>\n
00:04:40MICHAEL LEWIS Again, what do you mean do they deserve it? Did they– did they– they worked really hard. They spent a lot of hours in the office. So you can’t begrudge someone who starts a company and employs lots of people and so on and so forth for making a lot of money. I don’t mind people making a lot of money. On Wall Street, the business has become very obviously divorced from productivity– from– from productive enterprise. So, in that sense, no. They don’t deserve it. They didn’t earn it. They– what they did was finagle it. They — they managed. They were very good at putting themselves in the middle of large financial transactions that probably shouldn’t have happened in the first place and taking out little pieces of it. They generated trillions of dollars of subprime mortgage loans that should never have been made. But, the world would be better off if that whole industry had never existed. So that– that’s– that’s crazy. <\/p>\n
00:05:40STEVE KROFT Lewis says the more people learn about what happened, the angrier they become. <\/p>\n
00:05:45STEVE KROFT What about reform? I mean, do you see anything– did you see anything happen? <\/p>\n
00:05:50MICHAEL LEWIS There are several things that obviously should be done, that have not been done. And you can’t explain to my mother why they haven’t been done. Only a really smart person on Wall Street could explain why they haven’t been done. But for example, all right, one of the things at the bottom of this crisis, we– we had these ratings agencies that called a lot of things AAA–gold-plated securities–that were worthless. And the ratings agencies are paid, of course, by the Wall Street firms for their ratings. Why is that allowed? Why– why can you buy a rating? That seems like a very obvious thing to change. And people talk about it, but it hadn’t happened. Credit default swaps, insurance contracts that we trade freely, but it’s not– not classified as insurance. This market is the closest thing to sort of ground zero of the recent calamity. And yet, nothing has been done to change the market. Nothing’s been done to make it more transparent. Nothing’s been done to make it more like what it is, an insurance market. That’s an obvious reform. From the time I was at Salomon Brothers, it was incredible to me that the firm could advise customers what to buy and sell. At the same time, they are betting on the things that they are trying to sell their customers. So, I might call you up and say, wow, this– these subprime mortgage loans, they look really, really good. And, you know, this pile over here, you ought to– you invest in that pile. And, meanwhile, the traders behind me are betting against it. <\/p>\n
00:07:30STEVE KROFT Lewis believes the financial industry is living in a world so disconnected from American life that it cannot be sustained. He thinks it may take a while, but he believes that Wall Street, as we know it, has done itself in. <\/p>\n
00:07:40MICHAEL LEWIS The leaders on Wall Street completely lost any sense of their responsibility to the society. And if you know you’re going to blow up AIG by putting twenty billion dollars of bad subprime mortgage risk into it. Even though it’s going to be very profitable for you, you should stop and say this shouldn’t be done. <\/p>\n
00:08:00END TRANSCRIPT<\/p>\n
Discussion week 5 Part 2<\/p>\n
Scavenger Hunt<\/p>\n
A stock market crash happens when a high-profile market index like the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones Industrial Index, tanks. Investors turn into sellers within an instant to try to get out of very risky situations. Any market day where stocks fall by 10% or more is considered a market crash, and this actually happens pretty often.<\/p>\n
Analysts differ about the actual number of stock market crashes that have occurred, but in the U.S. there have been several major crashes recorded. This is when the stock market lost over 10% of its value.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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