INTRODUCTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY<\/p>\n
M6A1: The War Powers Resolution: Intent and Controversy<\/p>\n
General Information and Instructions:<\/p>\n
Textbook: <\/p>\n
Sarkesian, S.C., Williams, J.A., and Cimbala, S.J. (2012).\u00a0 \u00a0U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics\u00a05th Edition.\u00a0\u00a0Boulder, CO:\u00a0 Lynne Riemer Publishers.<\/p>\n
Module Notes:<\/p>\n
Module 6: Overview & Outcomes<\/p>\n
Overview<\/p>\n
During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy prudently ordered the cancellation of planned reconnaissance over-flights of the Soviet Union. At the height of the crisis \u201cBlack Saturday,” October 27, however, the president was informed that despite his order, a scheduled U-2 spy plane flight had deviated from its flight plan and was deep inside Soviet airspace. Responding to the news, Kennedy observed \u201cThere\u2019s always some son of a bitch that doesn\u2019t get the word.\u201d<\/p>\n
In previous modules we have examined America\u2019s national security establishment, including the executive branch, the Department of Defense and the intelligence community. As\u00a0JFK\u00a0learned, coordinating this machinery presents unique difficulties. In this module, we first explore the means by which presidents have attempted to organize and manage this vast enterprise in order to ensure that accurate, timely information is available to render decisions of the highest order, and that these instruments of statecraft respond effectively to presidential command. We have seen that the framers of the Constitution feared tyranny and distributed power accordingly. This module also explores the impressive constitutional authority granted to Congress in the realm of national security and the power relationship between the White House and Capitol Hill.<\/p>\n
Module 6: Learning & Assessment Activities<\/p>\n
During this module you will:<\/p>\n
Read:<\/p>\n
Required<\/p>\n
Sarkesian, S., Williams, J. & Cimbala, S. (2012).\u00a0US\u00a0national security: Policymakers, processes, and politics.\u00a0(5th\u00a0ed.). Boulder,\u00a0CO: L. Rienner.<\/p>\n
Chapter 10 – \u201cThe Policy Process\u201d\u00a0pp.\u00a0199-210<\/p>\n
Chapter 11 – \u201cThe President and Congress\u201d pp. 211-228<\/p>\n
Module Notes: National Security Policy-Coordinating the Players<\/p>\n
Module 6: Module Notes: National Security Policy: Coordinating the Players<\/p>\n
In previous modules we have examined the politics of national security in the context of the division of powers mandated by the Constitution and have specifically analyzed the role of the president and the wider executive branch, including the National Security Council, Pentagon and intelligence community, in the formulation and implementation of policy. In this module we first study in detail the organization of the National Security Council and its evolving role in policymaking. We then turn to an examination of the role of Congress in national security affairs.<\/p>\n
Directing the military response to Cambodia\u2019s seizure of American merchant ship S.S.\u00a0Mayaguez\u00a0in 1975, President Gerald Ford was able to provide specific, direct orders to\u00a0U.S.\u00a0Navy pilots in aircraft on the opposite side of the Earth; such events provide insight into the global power exercised by the chief executive and the immense command, control and communications establishment required to fulfill such directives. In spite of the incredible power indicated by the president\u2019s role as commander in chief, important factors condition the exercise of this authority; as John F. Kennedy learned in 1962, at times, even presidential orders can be futile in the context of the global organization of U.S. power. Perhaps more significantly, the president is human, and must organize the national security apparatus which can be inherently resistant to central authority, in a manner that suits his unique personality and ensures the fulfillment of presidential directives.<\/p>\n
The international political environment generates intense information processing requirements, as exemplified by the Presidential Daily Briefing, and even with the timely provision of accurate information it is difficult to identify the optimal response to any situation and correctly foresee the consequences of decisions. The intelligence community possesses impressive capabilities, yet as we have seen (in Module 5) in the case of the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing and the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), all such material is liable to be imperfect and incomplete. Finally, given the nature of national security affairs, many decisions of these decisions-of the highest order-must be made in haste, and generate intense stress, as can be seen in official White House photographs from events like 9\/11.<\/p>\n
Every president enters office with a distinct skill set and personal efficacy regarding the management of national security policy. George H.W. Bush for example gained the Oval Office after long experience, including service as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Ambassador to the United Nations and of course eight years as vice-president in the Reagan Administration; his competence in this sphere was unquestionable and he expressed obvious self-confidence in world politics. His successor Bill Clinton assumed office with very limited experience in international relations. Clinton had been Governor of Arkansas, and felt most comfortable engaging domestic policy, especially economic affairs. Clinton expected to concentrate on domestic policy, but found himself embroiled in important security and diplomatic decisions soon after entering office, and like every president he confronted the task of organizing the complex array of national security institutions to respond to his requirements. Even presidential authority can encounter difficulty orchestrating the machinery of diplomacy and military power.\u00a0JFK, for example likened interaction with the State Department to \u201cpunching jelly\u201d and other presidents have expressed similar sentiments.<\/p>\n
The means by which the chief executive arranges the organization of national security affairs is informed, fundamentally, by their personality, cognitive capabilities, orientation toward conflict and other variables. Political scientist Alexander George provides valuable insights regarding the consequences of these traits; regarding cognitive aptitude, Zane Grey westerns were Ronald Reagan\u2019s favorite reading. He seldom displayed profound interest in most of the policy matters under his consideration, and his staff knew that lengthy briefings would lull him to sleep. Jimmy Carter on the other hand was a trained engineer and voracious reader who enjoyed immersing himself in the most complex aspects of policy. In terms of efficacy and personal competence-what the president feels he is good at-Carter and Reagan again provide distinct contrasts. A former actor, Reagan recognized his limits as a thinker but was an unusually effective communicator and a masterful exploiter of his role as head of state; Carter, to the contrary attempted to convey a sense of the common man in his public persona and rarely demonstrated impressive skills in communicating with the public.<\/p>\n
Finally, presidential orientation toward political conflict can markedly influence the process of decision-making; the president\u2019s inner circle is typically populated with relatively like-minded people, yet even this group often produces sharp differences of opinion on policy issues. Franklin Roosevelt welcomed divisive conflict, and frequently acted to fuel these dissenting opinions among his advisers. Richard Nixon, on the other hand, found such clashes uncomfortable and sought conditions where his own opinions would be unlikely to be contradicted; his solution was to filter out inter-personal conflict among his staff through the use of a few high-level officials like Henry Kissinger. These key traits, cognitive styles, sense of efficacy and attitude toward conflict deeply influence presidents in their efforts to organize a management structure enabling them to harness the vast complex of national security and make it responsive to his authority. There is no ideal structure for the direction of national security policy; each president must fashion a system that is responsive to his own needs.<\/p>\n
The president decides, but he has substantial support throughout the decision-making process provided by his key advisers and the extensive bureaucracy at his service. In an earlier module, we learned that the National Security Council (NSC) is at the apex of this hierarchy, responsible for coordinating the efforts supporting the president and the principle forum by which policy disputes are resolved.<\/p>\n
The National Security Act of 1947 did not specify the exact structure of the NSC, leaving individual presidents considerable freedom to structure the organization to best serve his purposes; as a result, there was substantial variation in the role and organization of the NSC throughout much of the Cold War, and its structure has evolved substantially, especially regarding the role of the National Security Assistant (NSA). Dramatic change occurred in the late 1980s; Ronald Reagan neglected the careful organization of the NSC and the NSA did not enjoy privileged status in his administration. The president lost control of the organization. Rather than performing its lawfully mandated role, under John Poindexter, the NSC assumed policy-making and implementation powers; a government within a government. The Iran-Contra scandal revealed the consequences of mismanagement. The NSC staff arranged for the transfer of arms to Iran without the assent of the State Department, and illegally delivered the profits from this scheme to the Contras to assist in their efforts to topple the government of Nicaragua. In 1987 the report of the Tower Commission on Iran-Contra revealed the magnitude of dysfunction at the National Security Council and in 1989 one of its members, General Brent Scowcroft was appointed National Security Assistant by newly elected president George H.W. Bush.<\/p>\n
Scowcroft had served previously as NSA under Gerald Ford, and in his new tenure he implemented organizational changes that have endured without major revision through each successive administration. At the peak of the organization is the NSC itself, as we recall, the President himself and his most senior national security officials and advisers. Scowcroft created a new venue, the NSC Principals Committee (NSC\/PC) enabling senior officials to meet without presidential attendance. Chaired by the NSA, the Principals Committee can develop policy recommendations without consuming the president\u2019s time and in the absence of his personal presence and influence which may distort debate.<\/p>\n
In the Scowcroft model, the central mechanism for interagency coordination is the Deputies Committee (NSC\/DC) chaired by the Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and composed of the number two officials from the member (State, Defense etc.) departments. Meeting frequently, the NSC\/DC is the core of the national security policymaking process serving the president, initiating studies and reviews of major policy issues and responding to directives from the Oval Office. At the third level of organization, Interagency Policy Committees (NSC\/IPC) are issue groups involving representation from the departmental assistant secretary level and charged with preparing materials for consideration at meetings of the NSC and NSC\/PC.<\/p>\n
We have seen that the American president enjoys both world-spanning power and a coordinating mechanism in the National Security Council that assists him in making decisions about the use of that power. We have also learned that while the founders recognized the matchless role of the executive in national security (secrecy, dispatch etc.) they were also deeply suspicious of concentrated power; for this reason the Constitution makes a substantial grant of power in national security affairs to the Congress, and along with its other responsibilities coordinating national security, the White House must engage in cooperative relations with Capitol Hill. At times, the relationship can be beneficial to the conduct of statecraft; in negotiations with foreign governments for example, diplomats might usefully deploy Congress as a \u201cbad cop\u201d whose position is far afield from that of the White House, in order to gain advantage. On the other hand, if the relationship is mismanaged and communications between the executive and Congress are dysfunctional, policy can be gridlocked, with serious consequences for national security.<\/p>\n
The Constitution uses just 223 words to describe the powers of the Chief Executive in Article II. It devotes considerably more energy to enumerating the powers of the Congress in Article I, and there is certainly evidence to suggest the founders intended the legislative branch to play the dominant role in policymaking. In any estimation, the Constitution specifies a powerful grant of authority in national security to the Congress, and it is perhaps the world\u2019s most powerful legislative body; recall, for example, that Congress created the Department of Defense, NSC and\u00a0CIA\u00a0in 1947. As we have seen, the founders consciously distributed power across the branches of government, resulting in an \u201cinvitation to struggle\u201d for the direction of policy in defense and foreign policy. Through America\u2019s history this fact has resulted in a pendulum effect; in certain times Congress has been assertive, mobilizing its power to determine national security policy. As our reading indicates, for example, during the Vietnam War Congress challenged presidential authority and created new capabilities to ensure its continuing relevance in foreign affairs. For the most part however, and certainly in the era since 1945 Congress has been deferential to executive prerogative in this realm, and has in fact either surrendered authority to the president or willing transferred it through legislative action.<\/p>\n
The Constitution enables Congress to influence national security policy through means that are either specifically enumerated or derive logically from those grants of authority.<\/p>\n
Lawmaking power-Article I of the Constitution specifies \u201cAll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.\u201d The lawmaking power provides Congress an extensive grant of authority in security policy; recall that it created the Department of Defense and CIA in 1947. There are two types of legislation that Congress utilizes in crafting national security policy; first, substantive legislation establishes policy directives and administrative tasks for the executive. An excellent example of this is the 1986 law passed by Congress over President Reagan\u2019s veto which restructured economic relations with South Africa, providing a powerful incentive for that nation to dismantle its racist apartheid laws. Procedural legislation in contrast, permits Congress to create rigorous principles but permits the executive broad discretion in implementation-as we will see, in the 1970s Congress used such legislation to restrain presidential war-making power. Procedural legislation can also be an important diplomatic tool, with Congress fulfilling the role of \u201cbad cop\u201d for negotiators.<\/p>\n
Appropriations-We have seen that the President is Commander in Chief, but has nothing to command unless Congress funds military forces; the Constitution specifies \u201cno money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequences of Appropriations made by law.\u201d The budgetary power is an important function that is shared between Congress and the president; only Congress can spend, but the president has much latitude determining how such fiscal resources are used. Spending is an important part of the national security policy process; Congress can deny funding for some activities-anti satellite weapons for example-or it may direct that the Pentagon purchase weapons that it does not want, as it did with the development of the cruise missile. This is important, as each service maintains certain biases towards missions and platforms-the Navy prefers to spend on submarines instead of sealift ships, and the Air Force would rather spend on fighter aircraft than airlift capability to support the Army. Spending at the Pentagon can also be distorted by congressional politics when \u2018pork barrel\u2019 politics specify the purchase of weapons beyond military needs.<\/p>\n
Oversight-This power is not constitutionally specified, but follows logically from Congressional authority to make law and allocate budget resources. Often this function can illuminate distinct problems in national security policy, as in the highly publicized congressional hearings on the Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s. Routine congressional supervision of spending can have important impact as well; the Air Force plans to retire its venerable A-10 close air support aircraft in favor of the new, stealthy F-35, but in 2015 Senators John McCain and Kelly Ayotte forced a fly-off between the two to determine if the F-35 was capable of assuming the mission of the older aircraft.<\/p>\n
Confirmation power-The Constitution specifies that presidential appointments of cabinet official and ambassadors are subject to the \u201cadvice and consent of the Senate\u201d and therefore policymakers like the Secretary of Defense must be first be confirmed through senatorial authority. This is hardly a rubber-stamp process, and the politics can terminate the ascension of a candidate to office, as in George H.W. Bush\u2019s 1989 nomination of Senator John Tower as Secretary of Defense; Tower was not well-liked by many of his colleagues and his social reputation damaged his candidacy beyond repair. Similarly, Barack Obama\u2019s nomination of Senator Chuck Hagel to lead the Pentagon was highly divisive; Hegel\u2019s qualifications were filibustered on the Senate floor-a first-and the narrow approval he received from his former colleagues sharply limited his ultimate effectiveness as Secretary of Defense.<\/p>\n
Treaty power-Like the confirmation power, this is exercised solely by the Senate; the Constitution specifies that the president can make treaties with foreign governments \u201cwith the advice and consent of the Senate\u201d and two-thirds of the Senate must agree to make any treaty law. While many treaties find ratification without controversy, the Senate role in diplomacy is quite powerful; following World War One Woodrow Wilson was unable to obtain Senate approval for the Treaty of Versailles and American entrance into the League of Nations. Gaining Senate approval for treaties has become increasingly difficult, and as we have seen, presidents have increasingly turned to executive agreements which do not require Senate confirmation in order to conduct diplomacy.<\/p>\n
War Power- Article I section 8 specifies \u201cThe Congress shall have power\u2026.to declare war.\u201d The founders, as we have seen, clearly understood the importance of the executive in statecraft and national defense, yet they were also suspicious of concentrated power; while the president is the commander and chief and has the power to respond to sudden attacks, the war-making power is clearly reserved to Congress. Despite this clear grant of authority, Congress has actually declared war on just five occasions, although it has authorized the use of force many more times, and presidents have engaged U.S. military forces on many, many occasions without any kind of congressional approval. A landmark event in this regard was the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; here, Congress delivered to President Johnson a broad and open-ended grant of authority to conduct war in Southeast Asia. The resulting conflict in Vietnam and elsewhere quickly escalated beyond anything Congress had anticipated, generating potent domestic opposition to the war. As our reading illustrates, in 1973 Congress enacted, over President Nixon\u2019s veto, the War Powers Resolution. This law has three provisions; briefly, it dictates when the president must consult with Congress, when he must report to Congress, and when he must terminate hostilities and withdraw American military forces. As the reading additionally indicates, implementing this law has been problematic, and no president since its inception has done more than provide rudimentary observation of its requirements, and there are serious issues regarding its constitutionality. In 2014, for example, Senators Tim Kaine and John McCain introduced legislation that would void the 1973 law and replace it with a War Powers Consultation Act which more accurately acknowledges the contemporary threat environment and the changing nature of warfare.<\/p>\n
In addition to these formal authorities, Congress and its members can influence national security policy through a number of informal mechanisms; individual members, for example, can amass significant expertise in distinct issue areas such as arms control, intelligence etc, and this authority can be very influential in policymaking. Additionally, Congressional activity such as the investigations into Iran-Contra and revelations concerning the intelligence community in the 1970s can deliver public attention, wanted or not, to debates in national security. Individual members, often reflecting the desires of their constituencies can also publicize distinct aspects of foreign policy and security affairs, as in relations with Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, the management of America\u2019s relations with Israel.<\/p>\n
The intentions of the framers of the Constitution provide a powerful, enduring influence on the conduct of national security; the \u201cinvitation to struggle\u201d we have observed over the formulation and implementation of policy has generated a struggle between the executive and legislative branches which for the most part has been marked by the increasing power of the Oval Office. Much of this has been determined by the requirements of the nuclear age, where warning and decision times are sharply limited. The founders, while averse to potentially tyrannical power also appreciated the logic and virtue of a strong executive, able to act decisively in response to a threat to America\u2019s security; here, Congressional authority in security policy is hindered by its very organization-535 individuals are seldom capable of achieving consensus, even without the exacting time requirements frequently encountered in world politics. Every member of Congress is ultimately a politician and regardless of their status in the Washington power hierarchy each Senator or Representative must respect the wishes of their constituency in order to succeed in the long-term. Here, trends indicate the power relationship between the Oval Office and Capitol Hill will continue to be dominated by the executive; the end of the Cold War terminated much of the consensus that had been established regarding America\u2019s role in the world, and Congress itself has become increasingly politicized with partisan and ideological divisions. Nevertheless, by virtue of the statutory authority invested by the Constitution, Congress, in ways good and bad, will continue to exert powerful influence over the formulation and conduct of America\u2019s national security policy.<\/p>\n
In our readings and in the module notes we have considered the organization of the National Security Council and the power and influence of Congress in policymaking in defense and foreign affairs. Now we apply this knowledge to active discussion of the Congressional role in national security and a detailed analysis of the politics of war-making in the United States.<\/p>\n
INSTRUCTIONS:<\/p>\n
The readings and learning activities in this module discussed war-making power in the United States, the political implications of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the authority and impact of Congress in the politics of national security. For this, and all position paper assignments, it is crucial to base your opinions and arguments on research.<\/p>\n
In this module we examined the constitutional division of authority regarding war powers. Now you will turn this knowledge to an analysis of the virtues and drawbacks of the 1973 War Powers Resolution.<\/p>\n
What was the intent of Congress in the War Powers Act of 1973?<\/p>\n
How would you characterize the impact of this legislation on congressional authority in national security?<\/p>\n
In your analysis, is this law a necessary extension of congressional authority in response to the growth of presidential power-or is it an unnecessary impingement upon the president\u2019s role as commander in chief? Why or why not?<\/p>\n
Evaluation Criteria<\/p>\n
Write a 2\u20133-page (not including the cover and reference pages) position paper thoroughly discussing the material presented during the week. APA citations are expected, an abstract is not. Include references from the module readings, textbook, and\/or additional readings and outside sources. <\/p>\n
This assignment will be graded using the\u00a0SPS Default Undergraduate Writing Rubric\u00a0(attached). Please review this rubric prior to beginning your work. Position Papers in total account for 56% of your final course grade.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
INTRODUCTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY M6A1: The War Powers Resolution: Intent and Controversy General Information and Instructions: Textbook: Sarkesian, S.C., Williams, J.A., and Cimbala, S.J. (2012).\u00a0 \u00a0U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics\u00a05th Edition.\u00a0\u00a0Boulder, CO:\u00a0 Lynne Riemer Publishers. Module Notes: Module 6: Overview & Outcomes Overview During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[10],"class_list":["post-96865","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-research-paper-writing","tag-writing"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/96865","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=96865"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/96865\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=96865"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=96865"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/papersspot.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=96865"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}