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COLD WAR
John Herrholz
AMH 2035
April 4, 2022
The Cold War was a period of great animosity between two superpowers, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In recent times, several new important pieces of scholarly articles and essays have revealed themselves casting new light on the events that transpired during the Cold War ultimately provoking debate. Many of the articles and essays are based on memoirs and governmental documents from both the United States and the Soviet Union as well as other countries involved in the conflict. These works have provided valuable insight into the role that numerous factors played in the war, especially regarding its causes. Yet, while many experts focus their attention on the contribution of ideas or social behaviors in the initiation of the war, based on evidence of the intricate connections occurring within and between the two “empires,” it appears that the cause of the war was far more ominous. Although many factors played a role in the unraveling of the events, at its core was the looming threat of nuclear war which set the tone for increased militarization throughout the world and which we still see today. Having said that, the purpose of this paper will be to arrive at a conclusive answer to the research question of what the core cause of the Cold War was.
Background
Nuclear threat originated during World War II, when the Soviet Union and the United States separately built the most devastating of all weapons, the atomic bomb. When the bomb was ultimately used by the Allies on Hiroshima, Japan, it forced the Axis powers to surrender instantly, consequently ending the war. While the atomic bomb ended World War II, there was no denying that the devastation it caused in Japan served as the hallmark for the nuclear arms race. It instilled fear around the globe that annihilation for the human race was just the press of a button away. The idea that the United States and the Soviet Union who were on the same side of World War II, each possessed such nuclear weaponry instantly marking the two superpowers as threats to each other and consequently the rest of the world. This gave rise to the Cold War. Firsthand accounts of the events at the time reveal that this new war caused several conflicts around the world, resulting in other wars such as the Vietnamese and the Korean war. Both led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and casualties. Aside from deaths and casualties, the participating countries were losing resources such as weapons and aircraft which amounted to billions of dollars. Still, neither side was willing to give up because the stakes were high: the strategic plan of Russia was to take the world under Communist rule, and the United States, as the pillar of Capitalism, was determined to defend itself and the rest of the world from the attack.[i]
On the surface, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that led to the Cold War seemed to be grounded in ideological differences, Communism versus Capitalism, but this is not enough to account for a war that lasted for nearly half a century. Instead, other, more potent causes need to be brought forth, and in this case, nuclear weapons rise to the occasion. Namely, the threat of a nuclear war is key to the history surrounding the Cold War to the extent that it might be difficult to pinpoint when precisely it entered the larger picture: whether it caused the war or only contributed to its escalation. According to Healey, nuclear weapons have long been used with a deterrent effect,[ii] looming in the background as an unwanted possibility for the future and a consequence for strategic missteps on the part of any country, especially a superpower. Although it might be counterintuitive that a weapon with a normally deterrent effect would cause a war, the potency of nuclear weapons lies in the fact that no superpower is willing to relinquish its grip on such a powerful tool for controlling not only continents but the entire world.
Methodology
The methodology based on which this research is conducted is an analysis of primary and secondary sources divided into three stages. For stage one, I will research four secondary sources to examine how historians have answered the research question. For purposes of research, I will rely on secondary sources to obtain a complete understanding of the historical topic at hand. The kind of research material that I will take from them is interpretations of the events preceding the Cold War. With this research material, I will try to determine the major reasons behind the war and suggest how this knowledge can be used to change the behavior of nations today. The methodology I used for picking the sources was based on the scope of coverage of the sources, their accuracy, as well as their objectivity and relevancy. The four sources I chose met all these basic criteria. Then, in stage two, I will investigate the two key issues that I will evaluate in stage one. I chose two primary sources to analyze and see what light each of them sheds on the related issues. I will be using primary sources as firsthand evidence of the historical events surrounding the Cold War, which is essential in bringing the events to life and better understanding the reality of that situation. I selected the sources depending on their relevance to the issues in question. Their role in the project’s goal of finding the most likely answer to the research question will be to support a deeper understanding of the series of events surrounding the historical period of concern. In stage three, or conclusion, I will evaluate all the sources and research material and present the logical reasons for arriving at an answer. Finally, I will discuss the broader implications of my solution for US history and contemporary society.
Secondary Sources
Matlock Jr.’s study titled Kennan’s Understanding of the Cold War answers the research question of the causes of the Cold War because, among other topics, it discusses the origins of the political tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States through the lens of George Kennan’s writings on the subject. The author argues that the United States government was doing “what was necessary to contain the Soviet Union and to avoid direct conflict that would have risked igniting a nuclear war.”[iii] More precisely, Matlock Jr. argues that “the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on reducing nuclear weapons when NATO began to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.”[iv] This relates to the idea that the nuclear threat was the main cause of the war since the tensions between the two sides in were rising the most when the negotiations on reducing nuclear weapons were uncertain. The author proves this argument by presenting specific primary source evidence, such as Reagan’s “memorandum. He made it clear that one of his principal goals was to establish a basis of trust that would permit the rapid and radical reduction of nuclear weapons.”[v] Clearly, the main obstacle to solving the political problems keeping the war alive was the increased armament, especially in terms of nuclear weapons.
Moving on to Leffler’s The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know’, it can be said that this source uses the lessons from the historical period of the Cold War to demonstrate that the underlying cause of war is power, which can be multidimensional depending on the context. In the Cold War, “the Soviets thought in terms of missiles . . . and sometimes the Americans did as well.”[vi] Specifically, Leffler holds that “although the United States foolishly multiplied its arsenal, the strategy of massive retaliation was really designed to deter all conflict.”[vii] What this means is that both sides took military power very seriously, especially the Soviet Union, so the United States had to compensate and present its influence and power in the military realm in order to prevent a further escalation of the conflict into a nuclear war. The author uses primary sources like the Marshall Plan to show Stalin’s military attitudes and “his commitment to world revolution.”[viii] Evidently, the Soviet Union tactically used the threat of nuclear weapons as an act of preventing the United States from intervening in the war more aggressively.
Then, Wesley’s Interpreting the Cold War seems to arrive at a similar conclusion: “the Soviet obsession with nuclear weapons in the Cold War was the foundation of United States policymaking. According to the author, the administration was acting based on a number of factors, but one of the factors that made the greatest “psychological impact on America . . . of 1949 [was] . . . the Soviet nuclear test.”[ix] That is, the argument in this article is that while America had no reason to make sacrifices “for the hypothetical advantages of increasing its sphere of power,” the Soviet Union was “in a pathological stage of political opinion,” thereby introducing “a revisionist policy backed solely by the power of a nuclear strike.”[x] The main primary source used in this work is Coral Bell’s writings, where she argues that “Russians have been able to use their air-atomic power as psychological backing for revisionist political objectives”[xi] Undoubtedly, then, Russia was unafraid to use the threat of its nuclear power to initiate a revolution, which complicated America’s position and forced the country deeper into the war.
Lastly, in his Structural Realism after the Cold War, Walz advocates the view that the introduction of nuclear weaponry was one of the most significant changes that fundamentally shifted the manner in which nations interacted. In light of the Cold War, in particular, he argues that the war took place in a nuclear era, as “nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly for others’ security.”[xii] The author implies that nuclear weapons follow “the anarchic structure of the international political system,”[xiii] which allows them to get incorporated into the broader scheme of international affairs. Walz proves his argument by presenting specific primary source evidence of the views that other global leaders have had in terms of nuclear force, such as European leaders, pointing out that if they “decided to merge their nuclear forces to form the nucleus of a European military organization, the United States and the world will begin to treat Europe as a major force.”[xiv] Although an example pertaining to the future rather than the past, this argument still demonstrates the role that nuclear forces have in determining the level of power that a nation rises to – much like what the Soviet Union was trying to do.
Primary Sources
Primary source research was a crucial part of the methodology of this project because it serves to answer the research question by ensuring that the foundation of the argument, as well as the interpretation of the conclusion, are informed by factual data. The first primary document selected to analyze was Healey’s Beyond Nuclear Deterrence since it was written during the Cold War and by an expert about nuclear disarmament and international relations. This source is strongly related to the research question because Healey elaborates on how fast the nuclear arms race evolved and how the Russians were building more nuclear weapons at a much faster rate than the Americans.[xv] I selected this source once I decided to investigate and emphasize the aspect of nuclear weapons as having a vital role “in the relations between Russia and the West.”[xvi] When analyzing this source, I was specifically looking for evidence of how big of a factor the nuclear arms race was in the war. The source proved to be excellent for that purpose due to the fact that Healey explicitly observes that the fact that the Russians “were never approached by their Western allies on a weapon which they knew to be underdevelopment may have been one of the factors which helped to produce the cold war after 1945.”[xvii] Nuclear weapons suddenly became the most dividing force globally.
The second primary source, written by Ward et al., talks about the Cuban missile crisis and how Cuba and Russia teamed together to try and destroy the United States with nuclear missiles. This event had a great impact on the Cold War, which is why it was one of the most significant moments that happened during that period. I selected this source in an effort to articulate how relevant global powers, in this case, Cuba, contributed to the dangers of the nuclear war, as I wanted to investigate the question of the time when “Americans were . . . awakened to the dangers of nuclear war.”[xviii] That is, the authors pose an important question: “when nuclear war could have been the outcome, how is it possible to justify. . . a casual approach?”[xix] In light of the Cuban crisis, the United States, just like the Soviet Union, was willing to use the threat of a nuclear war in order to gain specific aims, which certainly did not lessen international tension[xx] – it only exacerbated it. The third primary source, an excerpt from a speech given by Winston Churchill known as “Behind the Iron Curtain” we gain perspective from a world leader who for all intents and purposes predicted what was to come.
Conclusion
As Matlock points out the ominous threats of military pressure and the fear of complete global annihilation are the reason why the war lasted for so long. [xxi] It supports the theory that the nuclear arms race was the main factor around which the Cold War tension revolved, as well as its most fundamental cause.
Lastly, the following excerpt from the Prime Minister of England, Winston Churchill’s speech “Behind the Iron Curtain” describes the very essence of the threat that was to come. He stated this after having led the Allies through World War II, “From what I have seen of our Russian friends and the Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. For that reason, the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”[xxii]- In those few sentences, Winston Churchill described the very essence of the tension that was to come, The Cold War. Churchill being the brilliant orator offered a solution to the issue by stating, “If the Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations charter, their influence for furthering these principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If, however they become divided or falter in their duty and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.”[xxiii]. With his words, Churchill ushered in the Cold War. There will always be threats as seen recently, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and there will always be threat of nuclear war as long as the technology exists. Sadly, it is human nature not to relinquish power. One cannot help but surmise that to maintain global peace, there must be a collective effort from all countries that inhabit our planet to commit to the adherence of the United Nations Charter. It is only upon their doing so that we can live in a world where peace prevails.
[i] Life Lines (Dallas: Life Line Foundation, Inc., 1967), 1.
[ii] Denis Healey, Beyond nuclear deterrence (London: Fabian Society, 1986), 1-2.
[iii] Jack F. Matlock Jr., Kennan’s Understanding of the Cold War (Princeton University Library, 2005), 313.
[iv] Matlock Jr., Kennan’s Understanding of the Cold War, 314.
[v] Matlock Jr., Kennan’s Understanding of the Cold War, 316.
[vi] Melvyn P. Leffler, The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know’? (The American Historical Review, 1999), 504-505.
[vii] Leffler, The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know’?, 505.
[viii] Leffler, The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know’?, 505.
[ix] Michael Wesley, Interpreting the Cold War (ANU Press, 2014), 82.
[x] Wesley, Interpreting the Cold War, 84.
[xi] Wesley, Interpreting the Cold War, 85.
[xii] Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War (International Security, 2000), 5.
[xiii] Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War (International Security, 2000), 5.
[xiv] Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War (International Security, 2000), 32.
[xv] Healey, Beyond nuclear deterrence, 2-3.
[xvi] Healey, Beyond nuclear deterrence, 2.
[xvii] Healey, Beyond nuclear deterrence, 2.
[xviii] R. E. Ward et al., Sanity (Madison) (Madison: GI Press Project, 1963), 3.
[xix] Ward et al., Sanity (Madison), 3.
[xx] Ward et al., Sanity (Madison), 3.
[xxi] Matlock Jr., Kennan’s Understanding of the Cold War, 313.
[xxii] Churchill, Winston “Behind the Iron Curtain”
[xxiii] Churchill, Winston “Behind the Iron Curtain”